International Commercial Arbitratikon under the United Nations Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute by Swisher, Donald P.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 47 Number 3 
5-1-1972 
International Commercial Arbitratikon under the United Nations 
Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute 
Donald P. Swisher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donald P. Swisher, Comment, International Commercial Arbitratikon under the United Nations Convention 
and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 441 (1972). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol47/iss3/2 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
COMMENT
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AND THE
AMENDED FEDERAL ARBITRATION
STATUTE
Camden chose to do business with Amtorg and to accept, as one of the
conditions imposed, arbitration in Russia; it may not now ask the
courts to relieve it of the contractual obligation it assumed.'
With little fanfare the United States in 1970 revolutionized its treat-
ment of private international arbitration by acceding to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards and by amending the federal arbitration statutes to
give extremely broad effect to the arbitral remedy in most interna-
tional transactions. 2 As a result, a party with an agreement to arbitrate
an international commercial dispute to which the new enactments
apply can look to the federal courts and federal law for enforcement
of the agreement to arbitrate and for recognition of the award of the
arbitrators, regardless of whether the arbitration is to take place in the
United States or abroad.3
The new federal court role is not unlimited. Primarily due to ghe
method by which the United States acceded to the Convention, there
is a vast area of international commercial arbitration not covered by
the new scheme. In addition, even where the new rules apply, it is
1. Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Camden Fibre Mills Inc., 304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d
606, 607 (1952).
2. The President issued a proclamation on December 11, 1970 announcing the
United States accession to the Convention, effective from December 29, 1970. Conven-
fion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [hereinafter cited
as Convention], openedfbr signature June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S.
38 (effective for United States Dec. 29, 1970).
The enabling legislation passed to conform American law to the Convention can be
found in 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-08 (Supp. 1971). Those sections constitute a new chapter to
Title 9 of the Code. To distinguish them from the pre-existing arbitration statutes (9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970)), the new provisions will be referred to as the 1970 Act, while the
pre-existing sections of Title 9 will be referred to as the 1925 Act.
3. It would appear that the arbitration need not involve an American party, so
long as there is a basis for the court to assume jurisdiction. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 202(Supp. 1971). The 1970 statute specifically states that the federal district courts shall
have original jurisdiction over an action brought under the Convention. Id. § 203.
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often necessary to refer back to the pre-existing law to provide solu-
tions to specific questions concerning the enforcement of the arbitral
remedy. This comment will briefly discuss international commercial
arbitration and its enforcement machinery, after which it will analyze
the federal judicial role in international commercial arbitration, both
under the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act and under the system created
by the United Nations Convention and the 1970 Act. Special attention
will be paid to the changes from immediate past procedures and to an
analysis of the extent to which existing decisional law under the 1925
Act remains relevant to international commercial arbitration.
Many commentators have recognized the need for an effective arbi-
tral remedy for the settlement of disputes arising as the natural result
of increased international trade and commerce between parties of dif-
ferent nationalities. This need has been succinctly expressed as fol-
lows: 4
[I]nternational trade and investment must be seriously inhibited
if... disputes are not resolved promptly in a manner which reconciles
the interests of both parties. If the disputes are brought to courts of
law there will often be costly, lengthy, and bitter litigation. Differences
in procedure and substantive law between national courts may cause
unfairness to one of the parties. Litigation may end in such animosity
as to destroy existing business relationships. The very apprehension of
the dangers inherent in litigation, the despair of ever achieving a
speedy and satisfactory settlement of differences, may inhibit certain
Iransactions from taking place at all. International commercial arbi-
tration, by providing an alternative method for the resolution of con-
troversies, may remove this impediment to trade and investment and
thus make a major contribution to the prosperity of the ... world.
To fulfill this need, three elements are required: 1) an agreement to
arbitrate; 2) a generally recognized system for arbitration; and 3) a
method for enforcing arbitration and recognizing awards resulting
from arbitration. The first requirement is frequently met by the inser-
tion of arbitration clauses in commercial contracts involving interna-
tional transactions. A properly drafted clause will resolve questions
concerning what is to be arbitrated, when, where, how the arbitrators
4. Gardner, Economic and Political Implications of International Commercial
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBirRATION 15, 16-17 (M. Domke ed. 1958)
[hereinafter cited as I.T.A.]
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are to be chosen, and what rules are to be followed. '5 'The second
requirement is fulfilled through the increasingly effective private or-
ganizations which provide the machinery for arbitration, foremost
of which are the International Chamber of Commerce and the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association." The third element requires the develop-
ment of judicial machinery which will provide a reasonable opportu-
nity for enforcement of the arbitral remedy with a minimum of dis-
tinction between foreign and domestic arbitration. It is this require-
ment which has been the most troublesome and to which this analysis
is primarily devoted. It must be fulfilled both at the national and
international levels.
The American judicial machinery for handling arbitration of any
type was slow to develop. There was a persistent judicial prejudice
against the arbitral remedy, with the courts often holding on public
policy grounds that a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate was void as
5. Most of the arbitration clauses involved in the cases cited in this comment include
all or most of these elements. See, e.g., Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de Naviga-
cion de Cuba, 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957) (arbitration in New York by commercial
men residing in New York under the American Arbitration Association rules); Standard
Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1957) (arbitration to be settled
under the International Chamber of Commerce rules); United Aircraft Int'l, Inc. v.
Greenlandair, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Conn.), affd, 410 F.2d 761 (lst Cir. 1969)
(arbitration in Paris under the International Chamber of Commerce rules).
The arbitration clause may be invoked to bar an aggrieved party from taking his dis-
pute to a court which would otherwise have jurisdiction and to force settlement by arbi-
tration, assuming, of course, that the dispute is one intended to be covered by the arbi-
tration clause, and that certain other criteria are met. See part II B, infra. When a valid
arbitration clause governs a dispute, the arbitration procedures ordinarily will be ap-
plied in accordance with the contract, as modified by applicable statutes and treaties.
The rules established by a private association conducting arbitration will be followed
insofar as relevant and applicable.
6. For an indication of the role of the American Arbitration Association activities,
one need only thumb through any copy of its own publication, The Arbitration Journal.
See also M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 24-30 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
DOMKE]. Regarding the International Chamber of Commerce, see generally Wilnur, De-
termining the Law Governing Performance in International Commercial Arbitration:
A Comparative Study, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 646 (1965); Gormley, The Place of Com-
mercial Arbitration in Multi-national and International Organizations, 24 OHIo S.L.J.
617 (1963); Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,
14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 132 (1965); and Eisemann, Arbitration under the International
Chamber of Commerce Rules, in International Arbitration: A Symposium, 15 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 726 (1966).
Private bilateral arrangements also exist. For example, the Japanese Commercial
Arbitration Association and the American Arbitration Association concluded an agree-
ment in 1952 to govern arbitration involving commerce between the two countries.
Agreement between the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association and the American
Arbitration Association to Facilitate the Use of Commercial Arbitration in Trade Be-
tween Japan and the United States of America, reprinted in Appendix to Kawakami
& Henderson, Arbitration in U.S.IJapanese Sales Disputes, 42 WASH. L. REV. 541, 586
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Kawakami & Henderson].
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an attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction. 7 Only with the enactment
of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act and individual state arbitration
statutes did the arbitration remedy receive any real assurance of en-
forcement in the United States. 8 Even with enactment of these stat-
utes, however, there was no uniformity of treatment of arbitration
problems, and parties who included an arbitration clause in their
agreement remained uncertain as to whether and how it would be
enforced. 9 However, recent court decisions and the enactment of the
1970 Act have reduced some of this uncertainty by making the federal
arbitration statutes the primary law to which a party can look for en-
forcement of an arbitral remedy in international transactions.10
The development of American arbitration law has been accompa-
nied by efforts to establish effective machinery on an international
basis. Until recently, the United States concentrated its efforts on the
development of bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion (FCN treaties), which included provisions purporting to provide
for judicial enforcement of international arbitration." These provi-
sions are designed with rather limited goals. Rather than giving posi-
tive assurance that foreign arbitration will be enforced and awards
7. Many early decisions reflect this attitude. See, e.g., Tatsuuma Kisen K.K. v. Pres-
cott, 4 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1925), where the court held that an arbitration clause requiring
arbitration in Seattle as a condition precedent to a court action was void and unenforce-
able: and United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.. 222 F. 1006
(S.D.N.Y. 1915).
One of the principal purposes of enacting the 1925 Act was to reverse this judicial at-
titude. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924): S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong.,
I st Sess. 2-3 (1924); and 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924).
8. In addition to the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, by 1967 there were 22 states.
including most of the more commercially important states, which had enacted so-called
modern arbitration statutes. See Kawakami & Henderson, ,tpra note 6. at 560-61. The
Washington statute can be found in WAsI. REV. CoDE ch. 7.04 (1961).
9. See Kawakami & Henderson, .spra note 6. at 560-62. The authors indicate. how-
ever, that there has been some tendency toward uniformity, largely due to the adop-
tion of the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956 by a number ofjurisdictions. See Id. n.65.
Even among the jurisdictions with the so-called "modern" statutes, there can be
strong disagreement on how the courts should treat certain issues. For example, one of
the major issues in federal court cases concerned clashes between New York law and the
law applied under the Federal Act regarding separability of the arbitration clause
from the rest of the contract. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co..
388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967), and Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co.. 280 F.2d
915, 924 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960).
10. See notes 26-72 and accompanying text, infra.
I1. As of 1965 the United States had 16 bilateral treaties which included arbitration
provisions. These included treaties with Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, France.
Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Korea, the Netherlands. Nica-
ragua, Pakistan, and Vietnam. DOMKE, supra note 6, at 105. By 1969 Togo and Thai-
land had been added to this list. See 119671 18 U.S.T. I. T.I.A.S. No. 6193: 119681 19
U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540.
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from such arbitration recognized by American courts, they simply in-
dicate that such arbitration will not be unenforceable merely because
of the presence of foreign elements. 12 Nevertheless, these treaties
(where applicable) may provide one basis for the courts to give effect
to foreign arbitration. 13
There have been several twentieth century multilateral efforts to
establish international machinery to enforce arbitration. 14 However,
prior to the 1960's the United States refused to ratify any of these
treaties, and they played no role in American litigation concerning inter-
national commercial arbitration.15 This American policy was reversed
by the ratification of two important multilateral treaties, the first de-
signed to settle investment disputes between a government of one
country and citizens of another country, 16 and the second the 1958
12. A typical provision is that contained in the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment,
and Navigation between the United States and Belgium, art. Ii, 6, quoted in
DOMKE, supra note 6, at 105-06:
Contracts entered into between nationals and companies of either Party and na-
tionals and companies of the other Party, that provide for the settlement by arbitra-
tion of controversies, shall not be deemed unenforceable within the territories of
such other Party merely on the grounds that the place designated for the arbitration
proceedings is outside such territories or that the nationality of one or more of the
arbitrators is not that of such other Party. No award duly rendered pursuant to any
such contract, and final and enforceable under the laws of the place where ren-
dered, shall be deemed invalid or denied effective means of enforcement by the
authorities of either Party merely on the grounds that the place where such award
was rendered is outside the territories of such Party or that the nationality of one or
more of the arbitrators is not that of such Party.
13. See notes 109-14, 127-33, and 177-83, and accompanying text, infra.
14. Representative efforts include the Geneva Convention on the Execution of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, adopted September 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301; the Geneva Pro-
tocol on Arbitration Clauses, adopted September 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158; Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 2;
and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature March 18, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6090.
15. For an explanation of the United States' position through the 1950's, see Sulli-
van, United States Treaty Policy on Commercial Arbitration-1920-1946, in I.T.A.,
supra note 4, at 35, and Walker, United States Treaty Policy on Commercial Arbitra-
tion-1946-1957, in I.T.A., supra note 4, at 49. Both authors were with the United
States Department of State when the articles were written.
Sullivan indicates that the major obstacle to American participation in the
post-World War I treaties was the existence of inconsistent state laws. Other reasons
included concern over the diversity of national laws concerning arbitration and a dis-
trust of the treaty process as a mode of regulating arbitration matters, especially on a
multilateral approach. Sullivan, supra, at 44-46. After World War It, the United States'
concentration on negotiation of bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion long prevented a full consideration of the merits of a multilateral, approach, despite
some recognition that the broadened definition of the commerce power made it feasible
to handle international commercial arbitration matters on the federal level. See
generally Walker, supra, at 54-56.
16. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
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Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. 17
The 1958 Convention provides a method for the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate and for recognition of awards made by a for-
eign arbitral panel.18 Enforcement and the recognition of awards can
be denied only on specifically enumerated grounds.' 9 There are, how-
ever, several limitations on the applicability of these provisions. As a
concession to countries with a federal system, the Convention pur-
ported to be binding only as to matters within the legislative jurisdic-
tion of the federal authority, thus requiring no change in individual
state laws. 2 0 The Convention also provided that a ratifying or
acceding party could sign with reservations. The first reservation
states that a country, based on reciprocity, will provide recognition
and enforcement only for awards made in the territory of another
contracting nation, while the second reservation declares that a
country will apply the Convention only to legal relationships consid-
ered as commercial under the acceding party's laws. 2 1 In acceding to
the Convention, the United States adopted both reservations. 22 There
tionals of Other States, supra note 14. This Convention set up an arbitration center
under the auspices of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) with jurisdiction over
any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State... and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dis-
pute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.
Id. art. 25(l).
A major impetus for this treaty was the desire of countries like the United States to
develop a means of protecting the overseas investments of their own citizens. Cf. 18
STAN. L. REV. 1359 (1966). Given this motive it is not surprising that Congress deviated
from its previous non-adherence policy in this instance. In doing so, however, it clearly
recognized that the machinery could be invoked against the United States as well and.
therefore, exempted this convention from application of the Federal Arbitration Act.
See 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (1970).
17. See note 2, supra. The Convention replaced two earlier agreements which did
not have United States adherence, the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and the
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Convention art.
VII(2). See note 14, supra.
18. Convention arts. II and III. The provisions of the Convention are discussed in
several authorities. Of special interest are Quigley, Accession by the United States to the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1059-74 (1961), and Contini, International Commercial
Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 291-308 (1959).
19. Convention art. V.
20. Id. art XI.
21. Id. art 1(3).
22. T.I.A.S. 6997, supra note 2, at 50. The United States reservation read as fol-
lows:
The United States of America will apply the Convention, on the basis of reci-
446
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are interpretive problems involved in harmonizing these reservations
with the Convention and the statutes passed to give effect to it.
23
As a result of the reservations made by the United States, the Con-
vention extends only to arbitration taking place in a country adhering
to the Convention, regardless of the nationality of the parties. In con-
trast, the bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation
discussed above extend their protection to nationals of the signatory
powers, regardless of the place of arbitration.24 This distinction makes
it crucial to choose the place of arbitration carefully when drafting an
arbitration clause.25
I. THE FEDERAL ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Recent case law, America's accession to the Convention, and enact-
ment of the 1970 Act have focused attention on the federal courts as
the primary forum for enforcing arbitration and recognizing awards
resulting from arbitration involving international transactions. To
understand the federal role under the present system, it is necessary to
examine the original 1925 Act, the new 1970 Act and the Conven-
tion.
The process of determining what provisions apply in which situa-
tions is far from easy. The following generalizations, however, should
be kept in mind whenever an arbitration problem arises. First, the
1970 Act and the Convention do not apply to all international com-
mercial arbitration.26 Second, where the 1970 Act and the Conven-
procity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those awards made in the terri-
tory of another Contracting State.
The United States of America will apply the Convention only to differences ar-
ising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as
commercial under the national law of the United States.
23. See notes 56-71 and accompanying text, infra.
24. Compare the treaty provision at note 12, supra, with the United States reserva-
tions to the Convention in note 22, supra.
25. For example, notwithstanding the fact that France is a party to the Convention,
an arbitration award made in London under an agreement between a French corpora-
tion and a United States corporation would not be entitled to recognition in the United
States under the Convention, because the United Kingdom has not acceded to the Con-
vention; on the other hand, it would come within the terms of the bilateral agreement
with France.
26. Se'e 9 U.S.C.A. § 202 (Supp. 1971); T.I.A.S. 6997, supra note 2, at 50; and
notes 56 to 72, and accompanying text, infra.
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tion do not apply, the 1925 Arbitration Act applies in full and without
any modification. 27 Third, all provisions of the 1925 Act apply even
to arbitration coming under the Convention and 1970 Act, except to
the extent that the 1925 Act provisions conflict with the provisions of
the 1970 Act. 28 Thus, an analysis of the federal role in international
commercial arbitration must begin with an understanding of the scope
of application of the 1925 Act.
A. The Federal Judicial Role under the 1925 Act
When first enacted the 1925 Act represented a significant departure
from pre-existing arbitration law. Its major accomplishment was to
declare an arbitration clause valid and enforceable when incorporated
into a maritime transaction or a contract involving interstate or for-
eign commerce. 29 However, the Act cannot be readily characterized
and classified. One perplexing group of problems concerns the au-
thority upon which Congress acted and whether it intended to create
procedural law for the federal courts or substantive law to be applied
in both non-diversity and diversity cases under the rule of Swift v.
Tyson.30 Some language in the Act and some of the legislative history
indicate that Congress only intended to create procedural law for the
federal courts. 3' However, there is strong evidence that the legislators
relied upon federal control over interstate and foreign commerce and
27. The 1970 Act is limited to arbitration covered by the Convention. See 9 L .S.C.A.
§ 201 (Supp. 1971). The 1970 Act was created as a separate part of the federal arbitra-
tion statute, and made no modification of any provision of the original 1925 Act when
that Act applies to arbitration not covered by the Convention.
28. See Id. § 208, and notes 74-75 and accompanying text, infra.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
30. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). This decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in
Erie R.R. (o. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. One of the drafters described the Act as one that "declares simply that such
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal
courts for their enforcement." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1924). In an-
other place, the House Report unambiguously stated:
Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of pro-
cedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought and
not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of the forum in which the
contract is made.
Id. at I. From this history, Justice Black concluded in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 418 (1967) (dissenting opinion), that the statute "rests
upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and con-
trol Federal courts." But see the majority's reading of the legislative history. Id. at 405.
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admiralty32 to create substative law. Recent court treatment of the
Act appears to substantiate the latter view.33
Substantial complications regarding the characterization of the
1925 Act were created after the Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins,34 held that federal courts could not constitutionally
create substantive law in diversity cases. These issues came to the fore
in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,35 where the Supreme
Court held that the 1925 Act was inapplicable to a diversity case in-
volving a contract not in interstate or foreign commerce and indicated
that the rights of the parties were to be governed solely by state law.
The holding in that case was based upon the court's determination
that the 1925 Act did not extend to contracts not within interstate
commerce. Matters governing arbitration were treated as "outcome-
determinative" in the sense that term was used in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 36 and both the majority and concurring opinions inti-
mated that there was a serious constitutional question concerning
whether Congress had power to prescribe rules for the federal courts
to apply to arbitration questions in diversity cases even when the con-
tract involved interstate commerce.37 This view, carried to its logical
conclusion, would have made the 1925 Act inapplicable to all but
32. See H.R. RaP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924): "The remedy is founded
also upon the federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty;" and Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967): "[lit is clear be-
yond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incon-
testable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.'"
33. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); and Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 801
(1960).
34. 304 U.S. 64(1938).
35. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
36. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203-04, 208-09.
37. The majority in Bernhardt indicated the 1925 Act could not apply to a case not
involving interstate commerce. 350 U.S. at 202. However, the court in dicta stated
"Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does not have the constitutional au-
thority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship
cases." Id. It then distinguished and all but overruled Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp.
v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1934), an earlier diversity case applying the
1925 Act to a contract in interstate commerce, stating that its validity was doubtful
today as a result of the Erie decision. Id. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion indi-
cated serious doubt about the application of the 1925 Act to any diversity case, but then
stated:
[A] voidance of the constitutional question is for me sufficiently compelling to lead
to a construction of the Act as not applicable to diversity cases.
350 U.S. at 208. He also doubted the continuing validity of Shanferoke. Id. n.2.
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admiralty cases and those few commerce cases where the federal
courts had jurisdiction based upon independent federal question
grounds. 38 However, the Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.39 subsequently held the 1925 Act applicable
to a diversity case involving interstate commerce. In doing so, it also
indicated that the Act created "a new body of federal substantive law
affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitration agreements.
' 4 °
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,4 1 a
diversity case involving interstate commerce, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have adopted the Robert Lawrence rationale. In doing so,
however, it still left a number of questions unanswered. Relying heav-
ily upon Robert Lawrence, the Court applied the 1925 Act to the
interpretation of the arbitration clause in the contract between the
parties. It stated that the Act's application to this case was constitu-
tional and untouched by Erie and its progeny. 42 While the case spoke
approvingly of the Robert Lawrence "federal substantive law" charac-
terization, 43 it did not state flatly that it adopted this terminology.
However, both the critics and the dissent have treated this case as an
implicit acceptance of the substantive law characterization laid upon
38. See Comment, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration
Act: A Farago of Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847. 848-49
(1960).
39. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal disnissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
40. Id. at 406. The court then held:
[T] he Arbitration Act in making agreements to arbitrate "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable" created national substantive law clearly constitutional under the mar-
itime and commerce powers of the Congress and ... the rights thus created are to
be adjudicated by the federal courts whenever such courts have subject matter juris-
diction, including diversity cases.... We hold that the body of law thus created is
substantive not procedural in character and that it encompasses questions of inter-
pretation and construction as well as questions of validity, revocability and en-
forceability of arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce or maritime
affairs....
Id. at 409.
The Second Circuit adjudicates the bulk of the Federal Arbitration Act cases. largely
due to the presence of the American Arbitration Association facilities in New York
City. Consequently, by sheer numbers of cases the Robert Lawrence view became the
majority interpretation. Some other circuits, however, did not follow the Robert Lawr-
ence rationale. See, e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 ( st
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960), where the First Circuit applied state law to a
diversity case arguably involving a contract in interstate commerce.
41. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
42. Id. at 405. In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Black objected, inter alia, to the
majority's acceptance of the Robert Lawrence federal substantive law doctrine. Id. at
421.
43. Id. at 400, 404-05.
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the foundation of Congress' power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce.
44
The Prima Paint-Robert Lawi ence line of cases is troublesome. If
the 1925 Act is substantive law, it is a peculiar form of substantive
federal law, which, as pointed out in the dissent in Prima Paint, is sus-
ceptible to forum shopping of the type Erie and Guaranty Trust
sought to avoid, unless 1) the 1925 Act provides an independent fed-
eral question basis for federal court jurisdiction, or 2) it also applies to
state court proceedings involving arbitration disputes on contracts
involving interstate or foreign commerce.45
Nothing in the facts of Prima Paint indicates that the federal courts
have jurisdiction absent diversity. Any federal question jurisdiction
could only have come from a deterinination that the 1925 Act pro-
vided an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. However, up to the
present, it has been felt that the Act did not provide an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction.46 There are several possible explanations
for this view. First, Congress' failure to include specific language
granting original federal jurisdiction may create a negative implica-
tion that none was intended.47 Second, some authorities stress the lan-
44. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 421 (dissenting opinion); Aksen, Prima Paint v.
Flood & Conklin-What Does It Mean? 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1968); Comment,
Federal Arbitration Act and Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal
Courts, 1968 DUKE LJ. 588; 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 565 (1968).
45. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 417, 420. The majority discussed neither of these
two problems. It should be noted, however, that when the Second Circuit first declared
the 1925 Act to be federal substantive law, it indicated in dicta that the Act was equally
binding in state courts as well. See Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 407, and notes 52-54
and accompanying text, infra.
46. See, e.g., Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 408: "[T] hough new substantive federal
rights were created, suits involving the application of the Arbitration Act do not furnish
an independent basis of federal jurisdiction ... " (Medina, J.) (dictum).
This viewpoint has been basic to much analysis both among the courts and commen-
tators. See, e.g., 1968 DUKE L.J., supra note 44, at 608 & n.94; 69 YALE L.J., supra
note 38, at 861-63. Some of the legislative history can be read differently. See H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1924):
The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible (sic) agreements for arbi-
tration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdic-
tion or (sic) admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal
courts....
The matter is properly the subject of Federal action.... The remedy is founded
also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty....
The bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be en-
forced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement....
47. This implication is further intensified by the fact that Congress felt it necessary
to give explicit authorization for federal court original jurisdiction over disputes
coming under the 1970 Act. See 9 U.S. C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1971).
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guage of section 4 indicating a party may seek an order compelling
arbitration where the district court would have jurisdiction "save for
such [arbitration] agreement. ' 48 Third, some authorities rely on the
fact that section 3, granting a stay of proceedings pending arbitration,
cannot be invoked unless the case has reached federal court on some
independent jurisdictional basis.49 In opposition to this position, how-
ever, it can be pointed out first that the language in section 4 merely
was intended to preserve the federal jurisdiction otherwise ousted by
the arbitration clause itself,50 and second that the jurisdictional
problem posed by section 3 is more semantic than real, as a determi-
nation that the Act provided an independent basis for federal jurisdic-
tion would enable a party seeking a stay of proceedings to obtain
removal from state courts and then to invoke the Act to obtain a
stay of proceedings there. 51 Thus, it is possible that subsequent deci-
sions may clarify Prima Paint by holding that the 1925 Act provides
an independent ground for federal jurisdiction.
48. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). This view was adopted in Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at
408. It also has the approval of several commentators. See, e.g., Scope of the United
States Arbitration Act in Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, in Sympos-
ittn, Arbitration and the Courts, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 468, 489-91 (1963).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970). It provides for a defense motion to stay federal court pro-
ceedings pending arbitration, a remedy available only if either the suit was originally
brought in the federal courts (which assumes a jurisdictional basis other than the arbitra-
tion clause, since the plaintiffs action would be brought in defiance of and not reliance
upon that clause) or if the defendant had removed it there under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1964), a procedure unavailable to a resident defendant in a diversity action.
Some analysts use this section as primary support for their view that the Act created
no independent basis for federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 60 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 231
(1960): and 58 Nw. U.L. REV., supra note 48, at 490.
50. This reasoning conforms to the tenor of the times when the Act was passed. See
notes 7-8, and accompanying text, supra.
Some commentators indicated that section 4 should not be interpreted as an impedi-
ment to federal jurisdiction deriving from the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., 69
YALE L.J., supra note 38, at 862; and 60 Coi UM. L. REV., supra note 49, at 23 1.
The 1970 Act, which clearly grants original jurisdiction to the federal courts, includes
similar language in its venue provision. 9 U.S.C.A. § 204 (Supp. 1971). It can be argued
that the use of that phrase in the 1970 Act indicates that the previous interpretation of
section 4 has been too narrow.
51. This solution was followed in the 1970 Act. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 205 (Supp. 1971).
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970), indicates that where the district
courts would have original jurisdiction based upon a claim of right under a federal law,
defendant can exercise his right of removal without the non-residence requirements for
removal in diversity cases. Treatment of the 1925 Act as creating federal court jurisdic-
tion would eliminate the anomaly that the Act's remedies are available in the
non-admiralty case only when diversity jurisdiction is invoked either by plaintiff or by a
defendant not barred from invoking the removal remedy of Section 1441.
This solution also removes the basis for an equal protection argument frequently in-
voked by those critical of the Primna Paint formula. See, e.g., 1968 DUKE L.J., supra note
44, at 607-09, and 69 YALE L.J., supra note 38, at 862-64.
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The alternative approach for resolving the question of the applica-
tion of federal substantive law would involve the determination that
the 1925 Act should be applied both in state and federal courts. This
approach would preserve the Erie doctrine, reconcile Bernhardt with
Prima Paint and Robert Lawrence, and avoid the question of whether
the 1925 Act created an independent ground for federal jurisdiction.
The language of the Act and its legislative history appear to confine its
application to the federal courts.52 However, a contrary view, at least
as to parts of the Act, has been advanced both by scholars and in dicta
in some federal court cases, including Robert Lawrence.53 In addi-
tion, two recent state court decisions support the view that the 1925
Act may apply to some state court cases. 54
52. Sections 3 to 13 inclusive refer either to United States district courts or to "the
court" in a context clearly indicating that the provisions applied only in those courts. 9
U.S.C. §§ 3-13 (1970). Furthermore, the committee reports at the time of passage em-
phasized that the Act was intended to govern the federal courts. See H.R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1924).
53. The Act states unqualifiedly in section 2 that it makes "a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract.., valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Section
I defines "commerce" to include what is ordinarily considered interstate and foreign
commerce in the constitutional sense. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Nothing in those sections in-
dicates that they are qualified in the same manner as sections 3 to 13. Furthermore, ar-
guably the intention of Congress was to make these clauses enforceable in all contracts
with the proper relationship to interstate and foreign commerce, assuming, perhaps, that
the federal courts would ordinarily have jurisdiction to enforce them. Cf. H.R. REP. No.
96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); and S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3
(1924). Some commentators have supported this viewpoint. See, e.g., 60 COLUM. L.
REv., supra note 49, at 231-32; and 69 YALE L.J., supra note 38, at 861-63; cf. 1968
DUKE L.J,, supra note 44, at 14; 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 565, 568-69 (1968). But see 58
Nw. U.L. REV., supra note 48, at 490-9 1.
Although the Supreme Court has not declared itself on this point, the Second Circuit
is on record, in dicta, favoring the theory that the Act is binding on the state courts. See
Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 407: "This is a declaration of national law equally applic-
able in state or federal courts." Cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Air Board, 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959).
The 1970 Act finesses this problem by giving the federal courts original jurisdiction
over controversies covered by it and allowing the defendant to remove them to federal
court if brought in state courts. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 206 (Supp. 1971).
54. In AIS J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576, 255
N.E.2d 774 (1970), the New York Court of Appeals held the 1925 Act applicable
in a state court case involving a maritime transaction, indicating: "Prima Paint leaves
no plausible alternative but application of the Federal statute in state courts as well as
in Federal courts." Id., 255 N.E. 2d at 775-76. However, the court indicated that
since this was a case in admiralty, where federal substantive law normally would govern
in any case, its decision to apply the 1925 Act would have been made even without the
support of Prima Paint. Id. at 779. The court did not indicate if it would apply the same
reasoning in a non-admiralty case involving interstate or foreign commerce.
In REA Express v. Missou'ri P. R.R., 447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), in-
volving a contract in interstate commerce, the court denied a motion to compel arbitra-
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When the United States decided to accede to the Convention the
federal law of arbitration was in a state of uncertain transition. Prima
Paint, whether viewed as a case allowing the 1925 Act to apply in all
cases in federal courts dealing with arbitration of contractual disputes
involving interstate and foreign commerce, or as a case pointing to-
ward the creation of a truly national law of arbitration, affirmed the
growing importance of the Act in disputes involving "commerce,"
whether interstate or foreign. However, the 1925 Act was not con-
sidered to be a reliable statutory basis for enforcement of the provi-
sions of the Convention, and apparently for this reason the 1970 Act
was considered necessary. 55 The 1925 Act, with all its uncertainties,
still remains important, however, because its provisions apply fully to
international commercial arbitration not within the scope of the 1970
Act and Convention, and because the 1970 Act can only be under-
stood through an appreciation of the difficulties involved in applying
the 1925 Act. Frequent reference to the 1925 Act's provisions is also
needed to determine which are still applicable to arbitration coming
within the 1970 Act's statutory scheme.
B. The Federal Judicial Role under the 1970 Act: Arbitration to
Which the 1970 Act Applies5
The 1970 Act grants original jurisdiction to the federal courts for
all matters within the Act's purview.5 7 The scope of the Act is set out
in section 202.58 On its face that section would appear to make the
tion, indicating it was uncertain whether federal or state law applied, but "in the event
federal law is applicable, . . . appellant waived its right to arbitration as a matter of
law.'" hi. at 727. Since a similar result could be reached under Texas law. the court's
statement is at most an alternative holding that the 1925 Act might apply.
55. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2. 5-6 (1968); cJ H.R. REP.
No. 1181. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), and S. EXEC. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
56. The research and analysis in this and the next section were completed in the
spring of 197 1. Subsequently, there has been one article written interpreting the 1970
Act. See McMahon, Implementation of the UN Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards in the U.S., 26 ARB. J. 65 (1971), reprinted and fully annotated in 2 J. MARI-
rIME LAW & COMIMERCE 735 (1971) [hereinafter cited as McMahon]. The present anal-
ysis is written without regard to the above article; however, where appropriate, the foot-
notes include reference to McMahon either to indicate areas of agreement or to give the
reader ready access to differing interpretations.
57. 9 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1971). That section indicates that such proceedings are
deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States.
58. 9 U.S.C.A. § 202 (Supp. 1971):
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship.
whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a transac-
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1970 Act applicable to all arbitration agreements and arbitral awards
based on commercial relationships in the following categories: 1)
admiralty, 2) foreign commerce, 3) interstate commerce but involving
at least one foreign party, or 4) interstate commerce and involving
only United States parties, but with a reasonable relationship to a for-
eign state.59
Such a superficial reading of section 202 is inaccurate, however,
and the actual scope of the 1970 Act is far more limited than a
reading of section 202 alone would indicate. The true scope of the
1970 Act can be determined only by reading section 202 together
with the Convention as acceded to by the United States. As already
noted, the United States, like many other nations, adhered to the
Convention with two reservations. 60 The first reservation limits appli-
cation of the Convention to disputes arising out of legal relationships
"considered as commercial under the national law of the United
States," while the second indicates the United States "will apply the
Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and en-
forcemerit of only those awards made in the territory of another Con-
tracting state."61
tion, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the Con-
vention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Conven-
tion unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages perform-
ance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or
more foreign states....
Section 2 referred to above is 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), the part of the 1925 Act which defines
the scope of that Act to include arbitration clauses "in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. ...."
59. 9 U.S.C.A. § 202 (Supp. 1971). Although that section specifically excludes trans-
actions between United States citizens which neither involve property located
abroad, performance or enforcement abroad, nor some reasonable relation with one or
more foreign states, the section otherwise incorpoiates the full definition of commerce
and maritime transactions in the 1925 Act. Therefore, a transaction apparently could be
within interstate but not foreign commerce and still qualify for coverage under section
202. The above interpretation is supported by the legislative history. See H.R. REP. No.
1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970):
The second sentence of section 202 is intended to make it clear that an agreement
or award arising out of a legal relationship exclusively between citizens of the
United States is not enforceable under the Convention in U.S. courts unless it has a
reasonable relation with a foreign state.
But cf., McMahon, sttpra note 56, at 70. It should also be noted that the definition is
broader than in the 1925 Act. Thus, where the 1925 Act specifically excludes some em-
ployment contracts (9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)), the 1970 Act may include such contracts.
60. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text, supra.
61. T.I.A.S. 6997, supra note 2, at 50.
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The first reservation, limiting the scope of the Convention to mat-
ters the United States defines as "commercial," does not pose serious
problems in assessing the geographical application of the Convention
and the 1970 Act. Section 202 of the Act attempts to formulate the
definition of the term "commercial" which that reservation requires,
and it does so expansively. Where the 1925 Act was limited to matters
of admiralty or commerce, section 202 explicitly states that a
"relationship... which is considered as commercial" includes but is
not limited to the subject matter of the 1925 Act.6 2 Unfortunately,
however, it will probably take several court tests to determine whether
and how much this definition expands the scope of the 1970 Act into
subject areas where the 1925 Act was forbidden to enter.6 3
The second reservation, dealing with the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards, creates uncertainty as to the intended
geographical scope of the Convention and the 1970 Act. The text of
the reservation is taken verbatim from Article 1(3) of the Convention;
thus an understanding of its meaning requires interpretation of the
sometimes confusing use of terminology in the Convention as well as a
look at the basic organization of that document. While the substantive
provisions of the Convention are primarily divided between Article II,
concerning enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, and Articles III
through VI, concerning recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards,6 4 these Articles are preceded by several general provisions
found in Article I. Article I includes both a statement of the scope of
the Convention, 65 and the authorization for signatory nations to ad-
here to the Convention with the above indicated reservations.6 6 De-
spite the fact that Article II deals with enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, both the scope clause and the reservation clause of Article I
mention only "the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards"
62. Compare 9 U.S.C.A. § 202 (Supp. 1971) with 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970). But see
McMahon, supra note 56, at 71-72. McMahon believes the courts will construe "com-
mercial relationship' to mean "commerce" as defined in the 1925 Act.
63. Accord, NicMahon, supra note 56, at 72. One example involves employment
contracts. The 1925 Act specifically excluded many such contracts from the scope of that
Act.See 9 U.S.(. § I (1970). On the other hand, a dispute concerning an employment
contract between an American citizen and a foreign corporation clearly is a dispute "ar-
ising out of a legal relationship ... which is considered as commercial." Thus, it argu-
ably fits within the scope of the 1970 Act.
64. Convention, supra note 2, arts. Il-VI.
65. /d. art. 10l).
66. Id. art. 1(3).
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and fail to mention "the enforcement of arbitration agreements." This
confusion leads to three possible interpretations of this reservation:
1) it may apply only to post-arbitral recognition of foreign awards;
2) it may apply both to enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in a
foreign country and to the recognition of foreign awards; or
3) it may preclude the application of the Convention to arbitration
taking place within the United States.
A literal reading of the reservation and of Article 1(3) leads to the
conclusion that the reservation, by failing to mention enforcement of
arbitration agreements, applies strictly to the post-arbitral treatment
of foreign awards. If this interpretation is correct, then, although the
1970 Act and the Convention would apply to agreements to arbitrate
in a country not a party to the Convention, they would not apply to
the recognition and enforcement of the resulting arbitral awards made
in these non-signatory countries. It would be an absurd result, how-
ever, for the Convention and statute to authorize the court to compel
arbitration in a non-signatory nation but to deny the use of their
machinery for enforcement of the award which follows. 67 Further-
more, a more harmonious interpretation of the Convention rejects this
view. Since Article 1(1), defining the scope of the Convention, does
not mention the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, but Article II
specifically covers these same agreements, the term "recognition and
enforcement of awards" as used in Article I should be considered to
subsume the topic of "agreements to arbitrate." This interpretation is
logically consistent, both because Article II is considered by many to
be an essential part of the Convention,68 and because enforcement of
an agreement to arbitrate is often an essential step in the process
leading to the recognition of the award which ultimately results. If this
construction is accepted, then the United States' reservation would
make the Convention and 1970 Act inapplicable both to the
pre-arbitral enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate in a non-
signatory nation and to the enforcement of an award made there.69
67. But cf. Quigley, supra note 18, at 1063, which indicates Article II was not neces-
sarily intended to align itself perfectly with the rest of the Convention. Article II was
inserted as an afterthought, and the present language is the result of compromise. See
Contini, supra note 18, at 295-96.
68. Cf. Quigley, supra note 18, at 1062-64; Contini, supra note 18, at 296.
69. A collateral problem under this interpretation involves the "on the basis of reci-
procity" language of the United States reservation. It is possible to argue that that lan-
guage means that the United States will enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a foreign
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The next question is whether the reservation should be construed so
as to exclude all arbitration in the United States from the application
of the Convention and the 1970 Act. There would appear to be no
valid reason for doing so. First, the use of the phrase "on the basis of
Reciprocity" implies that the reservation is intended to apply only to
arbitration in foreign countries. Furthermore, the Convention indi-
cates that it extends to arbitration taking place within the territory of
a signatory power, but not considered "domestic" by that country's
laws.7 0 In addition, several sections of the 1970 Act indicate a legisla-
tive intention to make the Convention and Act applicable to arbitra-
tion within the United States which falls within the subject matter of
section 202.7 1
Based upon the above analysis, it seems clear that the sweeping
provisions of the 1970 Act apply to arbitration both within the United
States and abroad, and that they preempt only a part of the field of
international commercial arbitration. Where the arbitration is to take
place in a country not a party to the Convention, one can only look to
the pre-existing legal structure for guidance.72 The list of countries not
parties to the Convention is quite long, and it includes several major
commercial countries.73 Thus, it is unwise to rely upon the Act and
country only if that country is a party to the Convention and if its courts would simi-
larly enforce agreements to arbitrate in this country. However, there is no evidence that
the United States has placed such an interpretation upon that reservation. Rather, it was
intended to limit enforcement to arbitration in countries party to the Convention. See
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTING ITHE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, SEN. EXEC. Doc. E., 90th Cong.. 2d Sess.
18(1968).
70. Convention supra note 2, art. (l). The distinction between "domestic" and
"non-domestic" arbitration appears in the laws of several European countries, but is
unknown to the common law countries. It relates more to the choice of law than to the
place of arbitration. See Contini, supra note 18, at 292-93, and Quigley, supra note 18.
at 1060-61. Nothing in the Convention, however, precludes a country from establishing
a category of "non-domestic" arbitration to which the Convention would apply.
McMahon appears to conclude that the Convention does not apply to arbitration in
the United States. He does recognize, however, that application of the Convention to
some arbitration within the United States would not be illogical, given the language in
Section 202. See McMahon, supra note 56, at 70.
71. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 202, 204, 206 (Supp. 1971). It would appear that the
statute has isolated a class of arbitration controversies which can be labeled as "not
wholly domestic" and indicated that they fall within the Convention's terms.
72. Under all interpretations of the United States reservation, the 1970 Act will not
apply to arbitration awards made in non-signatory countries. See notes 64-69 and ac-
companying text, supra, and McMahon, supra note 56, at 72.
73. For a list of the countries adhering to the Convention as of December 29. 1970.
see T.I.A.S., No. 6997, supra note 2, at 45-50. Perhaps surprisingly, most European
communist nations have ratified. Non-signators include the United Kingdom, Canada,
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Convention without first determining whether the particular dispute
concerning arbitration is covered by this new system.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE 1970 ACT
UPON FEDERAL COURT TREATMENT OF
ARBITRATION PROBLEMS
To determine the full impact of the 1970 Act on pre-existing law, it
is necessary to examine the operation of the 1970 Act provisions, and
then to note how they will apply in the critical areas where the courts
have been brought into the arbitration process. This involves compar-
ison and contrast with the results derived from the 1925 Act and the
bilateral treaty structure set up by the United States prior to acceding
to the Convention. These areas include the pre-arbitration problems
concerning motions to stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration
and motions to compel arbitration, and the post-arbitral problems in
recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards.
A. Operation of the 1970 Act
The drafters of the 1970 Act chose to superimpose its provisions
upon the existing structure of the 1925 Act, rather than to make spe-
cific amendments to the individual sections of that Act.74 The final
provision of the 1970 Act, section 208, declares all provisions of the
1925 Act applicable to actions and proceedings under the 1970 Act
"to the extent [the 1925 Act] is not in conflict with [the 1970 Act] or
the Convention as ratified by the United States. ''75 As a drafting tech-
Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, most Latin American and African
countries, most of the Arab world, China, and nine countries with which the United States
has bilateral FCN treaties with provisions for the enforcement of arbitration agreements
and awards. These latter include Belgium, Denmark, Iran, Ireland, Luxembourg, Ko-
rea, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Compare note 11, supra, with T.I.A.S. No.
6997, supra note 2, at 45-50. Of the non-signatory nations, the United Kingdom is most
frequently used as a site for arbitration. However, it is quite possible it and others may
accede to the treaty now that the United States has joined. See M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 44.04, at 370 (1968).
74. This approach was followed in order to leave the growing body of interpretation
of the existing Act undisturbed and to avoid complications the drafters felt would have
arisen had the new provisions been integrated into the 1925 Act. Letter from H. G.
Torbert, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State, to Rep. John W. McCormack, Dec. 3,
1969, in H.R. REP. No. 1181, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
75. 9 U.S.C.A. § 208 (Supp. 1971).
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nique, this method leaves much to be desired, and it is an open invita-
tion for litigation testing whether a particular segment of a complex
section of the 1925 Act is or is not in conflict with the recent enact-
ments. This provision requires thorough study of the extent to which
provisions of the two Acts conflict.
The 1970 Act is short and relatively straight-forward. In addition
to sections 208 and 202 already discussed,76 there are five sections of
the statute of substantive importance. Each of these either modifies or
clarifies a portion of the 1925 Act as applied to arbitration within the
scope of the 1970 Act; however, with one exception, 77 none of these
five provisions makes any specific reference to the 1925 Act. First,
section 203 explicitly provides for original jurisdiction in the federal
courts over any action or proceeding falling under the Convention,
regardless of the amount in controversy.78 Second, section 204 con-
tains a broad venue provision, clearly separating the place of arbitra-
tion from the place where the action is brought.79 Third, if an action
is brought in state court, section 205 allows a defendant to remove it
to federal court, in which case the action will be deemed to be an ac-
76. See notes i8-75 and accompanying text. mtpra.
77. 9 U.S.C.A. § 205 (Supp. 1971). See note 80 and accompanying text, infra.
78. 9 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1971):
An action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise
under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United
States... shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regard-
less of the amount in controversy.
It is generally thought that the 1925 Act did not of itself provide an independent basis
for federal jurisdiction. See notes 46-51 and accompanying text. supra.
McMahon, reading section 203 together with sections 206 and 207, indicates that the
1970 Act was intended to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts for all mat-
ters coming within the scope of the Convention. McMahon, supra note 56. at 73-74.
79. 9 U.S.C.A. § 204 (Supp. 1971):
An action or proceeding over which the district courts have jurisdiction pursuant to
section 203 ... may be brought in any such court in which save for the arbitration
agreement an action or proceeding with respect to the controversy between the par-
ties could be brought, or in such court for the district and division which embraces
the place designated in the agreement as the place of arbitration if such place is
within the United States.
Compare 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), which has been given a restrictive interpretation, and Id.
§§ 4 & 9-11, which appear to require that the action ordinarily be in the district where
the arbitration would take place. See notes 115-26 and 164-70 and accompanying text,
infra.
McMahon, while recognizing the fact that section 204 now assures that a federal court
can compel arbitration outside of its own district, feels that that section could be inter-
preted to narrow the choices for venue in an action to confirm an award in certain situa-
tions. However, he reads the 1970 and 1925 Acts together in order to resolve this




tion originally brought in the federal district court. The diversity of
citizenship restrictions for removal are inapplicable.80 Fourth, section
206 provides that the court may compel arbitration in accordance
with the arbitration agreement, regardless of whether the arbitration
would take place within the United States or in a foreign country.8 '
Fifth, section 207 establishes a procedure for giving recognition and
enforcement to foreign awards.8 2
B. Pre-Arbitration Problems
Although one purpose of arbitration is to avoid time-consuming
and expensive litigation, courts are frequently involved in
pre-arbitration maneuvers where one party seeks to ignore or avoid
arbitration. To understand the 1970 Act, it is necessary to consider its
impact on federal court decisions in the major situations where one
party seeks the court's aid to enforce an arbitration agreement. These
cases usually fit one of the following patterns:
80. 9 U.S.C.A. § 205 (Supp. 1971):
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court re-
lates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention, the de-
fendant ... may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such action or pro-
ceeding to the district court of the United States for the district and division em-
bracing the place where the action or proceeding is pending. The procedure for
removal of causes otherwise provided by law shall apply, except .... For the pur-
poses of [the 1925 Act] any action or proceeding removed under this section shall
be deemed to have been brought in the district court to which it is removed.
The 1925 Act contains no provision regarding removal, but the general removal stat-
ute is, of course, applicable to it, at least in a diversity case. See notes 49-51 and accom-
panying text, sutpra. See also McMahon, supra note 56, at 79-80.
81. 9 U.S.C.A. § 206 (Supp. 1971):
A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in
accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for, whether that place
is within or without the United States....
Compare 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970), which has generally been interpreted to require that the
district court's power to compel arbitration only be exercised as to arbitration taking
place within its own district. See notes 115-26 and accompanying text, infra. See gener-
ally McMahon, supra note 56, at 80-81.
82. 9 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Supp. 1971):
Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made,
any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this
chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitra-
tion. The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal
or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Con-
vention.
Under the 1925 Act, the status of awards rendered outside the district is unclear, but
most authorities believe they are not covered by that Act. See notes 164-70 and accom-
panying text, infra. See generally McMahon, supra note 56, at 83-85.
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1). One party sues on the contract and the other invokes the arbi-
tration clause defensively to move for a stay of litigation pending arbi-
tration in the United States, or in a foreign country.
2). One party invokes the district court's aid to compel arbitration
in the United States, or in a foreign country.
1. Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration
Under section 3 of the 1925 Act,8 3 when one party has brought suit
in federal court on a matter covered by a valid arbitration clause and
the other makes a timely and proper motion for a stay of that pro-
ceeding, the court will grant a stay pending arbitration regardless of
whether the arbitration will take place within the jurisdiction of that
court, elsewhere in the United States, or in a foreign country. Al-
though this proposition was originally in doubt, 84 it was settled defini-
tively for domestic arbitration in 1934,85 and has since been applied
83. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970). It reads in part as follows:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such ar-
bitration. the court ... upon being satisfied that the issue ... is referable to arbitra-
tion ... shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, pro-
viding the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
84. In The Silverbrook, 18 F.2d 144 (E.D. La. 1927), the first arbitration case de-
cided under the Act, the district court denied a stay of an admiralty suit pending arbi-
tration in London, indicating it believed section 3 and the Act as a whole applied only
to arbitration taking place within the jurisdiction of the court granting a stay. It rea-
soned in part:
This court cannot direct and otherwise supervise and conclude an arbitration to be
held in London, or assume to vacate, modify, or correct any award that might be
made there, or, indeed, anywhere, except within this district nor has it power.., to
arbitrarily reform, or modify the terms of the contract by ordering an arbitration
elsewhere or otherwise than agreed upon by the parties.
Id. at 147. Cf. The Beechwood & The Inverarder, 35 F.2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). But see
Danielsen v. Entre Rios Ry., 22 F.2d 326, 328 (D. Md. 1927), another admiralty case.
where the court granted a stay pending arbitration in London, indicating:
[T] here is nothing in the Act which indicates that, although the arbitration prov-
ided for may be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, this shall forestall or in any
way curtail jurisdiction which the court would normally have of maritime suits....
[T] he only limitation imposed upon the court is a stay pending the perfection of
what cannot be accomplished within the jurisdiction of the court, and such a stay is
to be clearly distinguished from prohibitions against assumption of jurisdiction in
the first instance.
85. In Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449
(1934), plaintiff sued for damages in the Federal District Court of the Southern District
of New York and defendant sought a stay pending arbitration in New York under a
clause which allowed a party to invoke state court machinery to compel arbitration. In
affirming the circuit court's reversal of the district court's denial of a stay, the Supreme
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consistently to cases involving foreign arbitration. 86 The Supreme
Court, however, has never passed upon the application of section 3 to
a case where the arbitration would take place outside the United
States.87
Court found that section 3 of the Act authorized a stay regardless of whether the court
could have compelled arbitration under the agreement or otherwise. The court clearly
recognized that to deny a stay on the grounds that section 3 did not apply would nullify
the arbitration remedy whenever the federal court had jurisdiction, but the arbitration
clause looked to another jurisdiction for its enforcement. It reasoned as follows:
[T] here is no reason to imply that the power to grant a stay is conditioned upon
the existence of power to compel arbitration in accordance with § 4 of the Act....
There is, on the other hand, strong reason for construing the clause as permitting
the federal court to order a stay even when it cannot compel the arbitration. For
otherwise, despite congressional approval of arbitration, it would be impossible to
secure a stay of an action in the federal courts when the arbitration agreement
provides for compulsory proceedings exclusively in the state courts....
Id. at 452.
86. There are many instances where a federal court has granted a stay of court pro-
ceedings pending arbitration in a foreign forum, 'usually basing the decision on section
3 of the 1925 Act. One of the most recent is Batson Yarn & Fabrics Mach. Corp. v.
Saurer-Allma G.m.b.H.-Allgauer Maschinebau, 311 F. Supp. 68 (D.S.C. 1970), where
plaintiff, a South Carolina distributor, sued a German manufacturer for contract dam-
ages and defendant successfully obtained a stay pending arbitration in Paris. After ex-
tensively reviewing the case authorities, the court concluded that the rationale of Shan-
feroke remained good law, "whether the arbitration is to be in the United States or in a
foreign country." Id. at 75.
Numerous other cases have reached a similar result. See, e.g., Sumaza v. Cooperative
Ass'n., 297 F. Supp. 345 (D.P.R. 1969) (involving a Puerto Rican distributor as plaintiff
and a Danish association as defendant on a contract calling for arbitration in Den-
mark); Mannesmann Rohrleitungsbrau G.m.b.H v. S.S. Bernhard Howaldt, 254 F.
Supp. 278, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("The circumstance that the arbitration is to take place
in a foreign country does not affect the right to a stay under 9 U.S.C. § 3."); Oregon-
Pacific Forest Prods. Corp. v. Welsh Panel Co., 248 F. Supp. 903 (D. Ore. 1965)
(American plaintiff and Japanese and American defendants on a contract of purchase
from Japan containing a clause for arbitration in Japan); and Fox v. The Giuseppe
Mazzini, 110 F. Supp. 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (American plaintiff and Italian defendant
on a contract to ship goods from Germany to the United States with a London arbitra-
tion clause).
87. The Supreme Court may have little occasion to pass upon the question of the
applicability of section 3, as a stay pending arbitration is generally held to be an inter-
locutory order not ordinarily appealable. Lowry & Co. v. S.S. Le Moyne D'Iberville, 372
F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1967), dismissing appeal from 253 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
There the circuit court specifically refused to make an exception to the non-
appealability rule when the arbitration is to take place abroad. Id. at 124. But cf.
Nederlandse Erts-Tankersmaatschappij v. Isbrandtsen Co., 339 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1964),
where the same court earlier reviewed a district court's decision not to grant a stay of a
suit where arbitration already was taking place in London between plaintiff and a party
for whom defendant was a guarantor of performance; Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui
Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1967), where the circuit court reversed a dis-
trict court denial of a stay of proceedings pending arbitration in Japan; and Carcich v.
Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1967), where the district court's refusal to
allow a stay pending arbitration in London based on defendant's supposed waiver of
arbitration was reversed on appeal.
The distinction in the cases might be justified by a rationale that when a stay is
granted, it merely means that the court will retain jurisdiction and have an opportunity
463
Washington Law Review
The Convention and 1970 Act add very little to the pre-existing
law governing stays of proceedings. The Convention confirms that a
stay can be granted pending foreign arbitration in a country to which
it applies, 88 while the 1970 Act indicates that the party seeking to in-
voke this remedy can obtain federal court jurisdiction over the dispute
by removal, if necessary. 89 If, as it appears, the 1925 Act's treatment
of stays of proceedings does not conflict with the Convention and the
1970 Act, then the body of law governing section 3 of the 1925 Act
would be directly applicable to a case covered by the Convention and
the 1970 Act.90 It is thus necessary to consider the factors involved in
deciding whether, when, and for what issues a stay will be granted
under the 1925 Act. The court should not grant a stay pending arbi-
tration unless "satisfied that the issue involved ... is referable to arbi-
tration under such an agreement."91 This determination may involve
deciding 1) whether there is a valid and enforceable arbitration clause,
2) whether the clause covers the particular dispute, 3) whether fraud
would bar referral to arbitration, and 4) whether the moving party has
waived or otherwise lost his right to arbitrate.
The courts, in deciding to grant a stay pending arbitration, must
often face threshhold questions concerning the existence of a contract
and of an arbitration clause pursuant thereto. The earlier cases gener-
ally assumed that all basic contract formation questions had to be re-
solved by the court prior to a decision on the motion for stay of pro-
to look at the situation anew once arbitration has run its course, whereas a denial of a
stay effectively foreclosed defendant's right to an arbitral settlement. This distinction.
however, loses some vitality when one considers the obstacles to a court's post-arbitral
enforcement of a foreign arbitration award not covered by the Convention and the 1970
Act. See notes 164-83 and accompanying text, infl'a.
88. The Convention indicates the court having a case involving an agreement to
arbitrate "within the meaning of this article [shall], at the request of one of the parties.
refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed." Convention art. 11(3). This provision was
intended to provide for a stay of proceedings similar t6 that in 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1964). See
Quigley, supra note 18, at 1064; cf. Contini, supra note 18, at 296.
Concerning the geographic scope of the application of the Convention, see notes
64-69 and accompanying text, supra.
89. 9 U.S.C.A. 88 203. 205 (Supp. 1971). See notes 78 & 80 and accompanying text.
supra.
90. 9 U.S.C.A. § 208 (Supp. 1971). See text accompanying note 75, sttprit.
91. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970). This language does not appear to conflict with the language
in the Convention. See Convention art. 11(3):
The court ... [shall], at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbi-
tration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or in-
capable of being performed.
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ceedings and could not be subjects for arbitration. 92 However, distinc-
tions later developed between formation of the basic contract and
formation of the arbitration agreement, and it now appears that as a
result of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.'13
the courts will limit their inquiry to issues related to the arbitration
clause itself.:j4 The Prima Paint rationale gives the Supreme Court's
imprimatur to the Second Circuit's view that the arbitration clause is
separable from the main contract and is not affected by the illegality
of the main contract or by its breach or repudiation by one of the
partiesY-5
A second important factor in deciding whether to grant a stay is the
nature of the particular arbitration clause, with the courts generally
distinguishing between limited and unlimited clauses. 96 Even with the
92. A leading case for this proposition is Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942), where the court indicated in a dispute over
defendant's repudiation of a charter party agreement with plaintiff that the issue of
whether a charter party had been made was not to be decided by the arbitrators, stating:
The Arbitration Act does not cover an arbitration agreement sufficiently broad to
include a controversy as to the existence of the very contract which embodies the
arbitration agreement .... [A] controversy relating to the denial that the parties
ever made a contract is not a controversy arising out of that contract.
Id. at 986. It then found the requisite contract formation and granted a stay.
93. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
94. Prima Paint involved a purely domestic controversy. In it the Court held: "[I] n
passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may
consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbi-
trate." Id. at 404. Although the Court was speaking specifically to the issue of fraud or
fraud in the inducement (see notes 99-104 and accompanying text, infra), at least one
circuit has interpreted the Court's holding to exclude the court's examination of all is-
sues related to the basic contract but not to the arbitration clause. The primary exponent
of this view was Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368 (lst Cir. 1968), again a domestic
case, in which the court indicated that the claim of no contract was an issue which under
the pre-Prina Paint rules would have been decided by the court, but now was left to the
arbitrators for decision. Hilti, 392 F.2d at 371. Sumaza v. Cooperative Ass'n, 297 F.
Supp. 345 (D.P.R. 1969), which involved a contract between a Puerto Rican distributor
and a Danish producer, relied heavily upon Hilti in concluding that a stay should be
granted pending arbitration in Denmark and appears to support the Hilti rationale in a
foreign arbitration setting.
95. See, e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,
409-10 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
96. Compare Sumaza v. Cooperative Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 345 (D.P.R. 1969) with In
re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961). In Sumaza the court granted a stay
pending arbitration in Denmark under a clause reading "[e]ventually arising dif-
ferences are to be settled with a perfect and mutual understanding. Place of arbitration
will be ... Denmark." Sumnaza, 297 F. Supp. at 347. The Puerto Rican plaintiff argued
that the Danish defendant had conspired to take over the plaintiffs market, and that it
breached the contract in several other particulars. The court noted the difference be-
tween limited and unlimited arbitration clauses, indicated this clause was "broad and
open," and allowed a stay over plaintiff's objection that the dispute was not covered by
the clause. In Kinoshita, a section 4 case, the court dealt with an arbitration clause lim-
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standard broad arbitration clause, the courts must determine the scope
of arbitration authority. For example, in Necchi v. Necchi Sewing
Machine Sales Corp.,9 7 the court decided that under a standard Arbi-
tration Association clause covering "disputes arising out of or in
connection with" a contract, the clause did not extend to matters re-
lated to the working relationships of the parties.9 8
A third closely related problem is the often raised issue of fraud or
fraud in the inducement. A party attempting to prevent arbitration
frequently claims that the contract and/or the arbitration clause was
obtained by fraud, and that the other party ought not to be allowed to
invoke the fraudulently obtained remedy, as this would mean that the
remedy obtained by fraud would be invoked to determine the issue of
fraud. The Supreme Court has twice dealt with this problem in the
past decade, both times in cases not involving international commer-
cial arbitration. In Moseley v. Electronic Facilities,9 9 the party op-
posing arbitration claimed that the contract was based on fraud, and
that the arbitration clause was an integral part of the fraudulent
scheme. The Court indicated:10 0
ited to disputes or differences which arise tinder a ship charter. The court construed this
clause to cover only matters of performance or questions of interpretation of the con-
tract, and indicated that, unlike the standard arbitration clause, which covers controver-
sies "arising out of or relating to" the contract, the scope of arbitrable issues was to be
narrowly interpreted. Kinoshita, 287 F.2d at 953.
97. 348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966). Although this
case did not involve a stay of proceedings, the analysis is the same.
98. That case was part of the involved dispute between Necchi and several American
affiliates, distributors and dealers. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that certain
items were not arbitrable. The district court refused to decide if each matter fell within
the scope of the arbitration clause, but instead "took the position that this decision was
to be made by the arbitrators." Necchi, 348 F.2d at 696. The circuit court reversed in
part, indicating:
[A] court must interpret [the arbitration] provision to determine whether it re-
quires arbitration on certain items prior to granting such relief .... Neither the fed-
eral policy in favor of arbitration nor the ostensibly broad reach of the arbitration
provision in question relieves the District Court of judicial responsibility of deter-
mining the question of arbitrability, unless the arbitration provision is so unusually
broad that it clearly vests the arbitrators with the power to resolve questions of ar-
bitrability as well as the merits.
It is undoubtedly true that [the excluded items] would not have arisen if the ex-
clusive distributorship arrangement had never existed.... But this is not sufficient to
render them arbitrable within the specific meaning of the arbitration clause . . .
which requires that the matter arise out of or in connection with that agreement
rather than the working relationship between the parties.
Id. at 696, 698.
99. 374 U.S. 167(1963).
100. Id. at 171.
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The issue of fraud should first be adjudicated before the rights of the
parties under the sub-contract can be determined.... [W] e believe
that.., the issue goes to the arbitration clause itself, since it is con-
tended that it was to be used to effect the fraudulent scheme. If this
issue is determined favorably to the petitioner, there can be no arbitra-
tion under the sub-contract.
But in Prima Paint the Court held that the issue of fraud was for
the arbitrators, not the court, distinguishing between fraud related to
the arbitration clause itself and fraud related only to the main con-
tract.10' In so doing, it adopted the position previously espoused by
the Second Circuit and in effect limited Moseley to those cases where
the arbitration clause was directly involved in the fraudulent
scheme. 10 2 The Prima Paint rationale should also apply to a motion to
stay pending foreign arbitration. However, there seems to be no case in
which the courts have clearly been confronted with this issue. It would
appear that the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements
implicit in the Convention and the 1970 Act would require applica-
tion of this doctrine to cases falling within their purview. 103 Even if a
court were to reject application of the Prima Paint view to foreign
arbitration, it still could decide the limited question of fraud, and then
grant a stay pending arbitration of the remaining issues.104
101. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
102. See notes 93-95 and accompanying text, supra. See Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410-11 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364
U.S. 801 (1960), where the court, after having found the arbitration clause separable,
further indicated:
IT] he parties are entitled to agree, should they desire to do so, that one of the ques-
tions for the arbitrators to decide ... is whether or not one of the parties was in-
duced by fraud to make the principal contract .... [A] rbitration should not be
denied or postponed upon the mere cry of fraud in the inducement, as this would
permit the frustration of the very purpose sought to be achieved by the agreement
to arbitrate.
'.. If this arbitration clause was induced by fraud, there can be no arbitration....
It is not enough that there is substance to the charge that the contract to deliver
merchandise of a certain quality was induced by fraud.
103. See Convention art. 11(3).
104. See, e.g., International Refugee Org. v. Republic S.S. Co., 93 F. Supp. 798 (D.
Md. 1950), where the court granted a stay pending London arbitration, indicating that
disposition of the fraud issue in a companion case prevented raising the issue as a bar to
a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. Cf. Reynolds Jamaica Mines, Ltd. v. La So-
ciete Navale Caennaise, 239 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1956), in which defendant successfully
invoked a clause calling for London arbitration. In that case, plaintiff brought a breach
of contract action, defendant asserted the arbitration clause as an affirmative defense,
and plaintiff argued fraud in the inducement. The court held that plaintiffs actions had
affirmed the contract and its arbitration clause, thereby foreclosing the fraud issue as a
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A fourth frequently litigated issue where defendant seeks a stay is
whether defendant has waived his arbitration right or is subject to the
doctrine of laches. Originally the question of waiver of a right to arbi-
trate depended on rules of pleading and similar technical matters. 105
Subsequent cases have greatly modified this viewpoint, so that the
issue of waiver turns largely upon the presence or absence of prejudice
to the other party.106 In the Second Circuit, the doctrine has under-
gone further modification, so that waiver may even have ceased to be
an issue for the court. There is language in cases involving a stay of
proceedings and in other cases that, by analogy to the fraud in the
inducement cases, 10 7 indicates that the question of waiver is for the
arbitrators and not the courts.1 08
The federal courts usually have treated motions for a stay pending
arbitration in a uniform manner, regardless of whether the arbitration
defense to the counterclaim. Plaintiffs failure to invoke the arbitration clause within the
contractually specified time then barred any recovery even though defendant was using
the clause as a defense and not to force a stay pending arbitration.
105. See, e.g. Almacenes Fernandez, S.A. v. Golodetz, 148 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1945).
106. See, e.g., Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie. 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1967). where
one defendant sought a stay pending arbitration in a suit involving a longshoreman's
injury arguably related to a maritime charter contract with a London arbitration clause.
The district court denied the stay, indicating that defendant's participation in pre-trial
proceedings and its delay tactics were inconsistent with its announced desire to arbitrate
and thereby waived it. In reversing, the circuit court indicated:
It is not "inconsistency." but the presence or absence of prejudice which is determi-
native of the issue .... [S] uch participation, standing alone, does not constitute a
waiver.... [M [ere delay in seeking a stay of the proceedings without some resul-
tant prejudice to a party ... cannot carry the day.
Id. at 696. Accord, Michael v. S.S. Thanasis, 311 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal. 1970). in-
volving London arbitration; and Batson Yarn & Fabrics Mach. Group v. Saurer-Allma
G.m.b.H.-Allgauer Maschinenbau, 311 F. Supp. 68 (D.S.C. 1970), where defendant, a
German manufacturer, sought stay of proceedings pending arbitration in Paris against
its exclusive United States distributor. In granting the stay, the court indicated:
[W] aiver or "default" ... may not rest mechanically on some act such as the filing
of a complaint or an answer but must find a basis in prejudice to the objecting
party.
/d. at 73.
107. See notes 99-102 and accompanying text, supra.
108. See World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.
1965). involving two United States corporations and New York arbitration, where the
court held that waiver was an arbitrable issue, indicating:
If the parties would entrust to arbitrators the defense of fraud in the inducement.
they would also entrust to arbitrators the defense of waiver. ...
Nothing in the Act prevents the parties from making a binding agreement to ar-
bitrate the defense of waiver.
Id. at 364. Accord, Lowry & Co. v. S.S. Le Moyne D'Iberville, 253 F. Supp. 396
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), appeal dismissed, 372 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1967) (involving a stay
pending arbitration in Paris); and Auxiliary Power Corp. v. Eckhardt & Co., 266 F.
Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (involving an action to confirm an arbitration award). But
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was to take place in the United States or abroad. This has been done
on the basis of the courts' reading of section 3 of the 1925 Act as
having no language limiting it to situations in which the arbitration
would be held in the United States. Due to this approach, neither the
1970 Act and Convention nor the previously negotiated bilateral
treaties' 09 modify the existing court doctrine surrounding stays of pro-
ceedings, once the matter has reached the federal courts.110 Rather, it
can be anticipated that the 1970 Act and the Convention merely will
provide additional justification for application of the pre-existing
provisions of the 1925 Act to the issues surrounding a stay pending
foreign arbitration. Such a role for the 1970 Act and the Convention
would be analogous to the present use of the bilateral treaties. In at
least three cases outside the Second Circuit, district courts have relied
on our bilateral treaties with Japan,"' Denmark," 2 and West Ger-
many 1 3 in reasoning toward a decision to grant a stay pending for-
cf. Tsakalotos Navig. Corp. v. Sonaco, Sociedad Internacional de Comercio S.A., 259
F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), where the court concluded:
[T] he issue of waiver, at least where it is based on the commencement of other
Court action, is for the court to determine .... Determination of waiver by other
conduct would appear to be within the province of the arbitrator.
109. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text, supra.
110. Note, however, that the 1970 Act may still be essential in order to reach the
federal courts in the first place. See notes 46-51, 78 & 80 and accompanying text, supra.
I 1. Oregon Pac. Forest Prods. Corp. v. Welsh Panel Co., 248 F. Supp. 903 (D.
Ore. 1965). In that case, which involved a complicated business relation between several
Pacific Northwest firms and Japanese firms in the wood products field, the court indi-
cated that the parties to the contract were deemed to have known of the FCN treaty
between Japan and the United States, and were bound by its provisions which made ar-
bitration agreements providing for arbitration in another country not unenforceable on
the grounds that the arbitration would not take place within the territory of the country
called upon to enforce the contract.
112. Sumaza v. Cooperative Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 345 (D.P.R. 1969). In that case,
involving a contract between a Puerto Rican plaintiff and a Danish defendant and in-
cluding a clause requiring arbitration in Denmark, the court alluded to the FCN treaty
with Denmark as an additional reason for its view that "arbitration in foreign places has
been repeatedly upheld." Id. at 349. It seems clear from this opinion, however, that the
treaty's existence was not essential to the decision.
113. Batson Yarn & Fabrics Mach. Corp. v. Saurer-Allma G.m.b.H.-Allgauer Mas-
chinenbau, 311 F. Supp. 68 (D.S.C. 1970). In this case, which involved a clause allowing
arbitration either in the United States or in a foreign country, the West German de-
fendant made a demand for arbitration in France, after which plaintiff sued for dam-
ages, defendant moved to stay pending arbitration in Paris, and plaintiff then sought to
compel arbitration in the United States. The court determined that under section 3 of
the Act there was no bar to granting a stay pending arbitration in a foreign country and
indicated that the "party first demanding arbitration should have the right to exercise the
right of choice ..... 2 Id. at 73. Noting that a FCN treaty with Germany was also in-
volved, the court used it as an additional reason for granting a stay, indicating:
To hold ... that arbitration abroad of a dispute under a contract entered into be-
tween a German national or company and an American company cannot be had
would nullify the plain terms of the treaty.
Id. at 76.
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eign arbitration. All three of these cases were decided by courts rela-
tively inexperienced with multi-national arbitration cases, and it ap-
pears that the courts were unsure whether the 1925 Act, alone, would
have been sufficient justification for their decision. Although the
Second Circuit, where the bulk of such cases are tried, freely grants a
stay pending foreign arbitration without relying upon treaty provi-
sions,114 a litigant elsewhere would be well advised to include refer-
ence in his pleadings to the 1970 Act and Convention or an applicable
bilateral treaty to insure that the court will properly apply the 1925
Act's basic analysis to a stay pending foreign arbitration.
2. Action in Federal Court to Compel Arbitration
a. 1925 Act. Where the 1970 Act does not apply, the primary basis
for compelling arbitration in the federal courts is section 4 of the
1925 Act.1 15 In cases involving arbitration within the United States,
this section has been utilized effectively as a means of forcing a recal-
114. Typical Second Circuit decisions granting a stay pending foreign arbitration
without mention of a FCN treaty include: Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692
(2d Cir. 1967); Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.
1967); Lowry & Co. v. S.S. Le Moyne D'lberville, 253 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
appeal dismissed, 372 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1967); Mannesmann Rohrleitungsbrau
G.m.b.H. v. S.S. Bernhard Howaldt, 254 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Associated
Metals & Minerals Corp. v. The S.S. Mihalis Angelos, 234 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Bienvenido Shipping Co. v. Sub-Freights of S.S. Andora, 168 F. Supp. 127
(E.D.N.Y. 1957): Giuffre v. The Magdalene Vinnen, 152 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1957):
Fox v. The Giuseppe Mazzini, 110 F. Supp. 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); and Uniao de Trans-
portadores para Importacao e Comercio, Ltda. v. Companhia de Navegacao Carrega-
dores Acoreanos, 84 F. Supp. 582 E.D.N.Y. 1949).
115. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). It reads in part as follows:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a
civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the contro-
versy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in such agreement.... The court shall hear the parties,
and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing
the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the termus ofthe agreement.
The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the district in
which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed. If the making of
the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be
in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.... If [the court or
jury] find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a
default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily di-




citrant party to arbitrate, both in cases involving interstate commerce
and those with more international aspects.'1 6 However, it has been
generally held that section 4 has no application to arbitration in a for-
eign country, and in this respect the courts have regularly distin-
guished the section 3 motion to stay proceedings from the section 4
motion to compel arbitration. For example, in the recent case of
Batson Yarn & Fabrics Machinery Corp. v. Saurer-Allma
G.m.b.H-Allgauer Maschinenbau,117 the court granted a stay under
section 3 pending arbitration in Paris, indicating:1 8
[T] he power to grant a stay pending arbitration under § 3 of the Act
was not conditioned upon the existence of a power to compel arbitra-
tion under § 4 and ... the Court may properly "order a stay when it
cannot compel the arbitration" and even though arbitration must take
place beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
This pronouncement relies heavily on dicta from the 1934 Supreme
Court decision in Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester
Service Corp.," 9 a section 3 case without international elements
which effectively severed sections 3 and 4 and allowed section 3 to
flourish.' 20 That this view of section 4 is more than dicta, however,
can be seen from the virtual absence of cases in which section 4 has
been applied to compel foreign arbitration.' 2 '
116. Representative cases involving multi-national aspects include: Trafalgar Ship-
ping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1968); Petrol Shipping
Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Commerce, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961); Cia.
Panamena Maritime San Gerassimo, S.A. v. J.E. Hurley Lumber Co., 244 F.2d 286 (2d
Cir. 1957); and Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de Navigaci6n de Cuba, 243 F.2d
342 (2d Cir. 1957).
Cases involving purely domestic aspects include: World Brilliance Corp. v. Beth-
lehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1965); and Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Constr. Co., 181 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.
1960).
117. 311 F. Supp. 68 (D.S.C. 1970). Earlier cases laying the basis for this dis-
tinction are found in note 84, supra.
118. 311 F. Supp. at75.
119. 293 U.S. 449, 452 (1934). There the Court stated:
There is no reason to imply that the power to grant a stay is conditioned upon the
existence of power to compel arbitration in accordance with § 4 of the Act....
There is, on the other hand, strong reason for construing the clause as permitting
the federal court to order a stay even when it cannot compel arbitration.
120. See notes 85-119 and accompanying text, supra.
121. The writer has only found one case which may have granted a motion to
compel arbitration. In San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Ter-
minals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961), an action to enforce an award made by arbi-
trators in Montreal under a charter party apparently between two non-U.S. parties, the
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The basis for this traditional view of the 1925 Act is the following
language in section 4:122
The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within
the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration
is filed.
The "hearing" involved is the court hearing to determine if the court
will compel arbitration.' 23 It has apparently been assumed that the
"proceedings" referred to were the arbitration proceedings. However,
section 4 taken as a whole can convey a contrary meaning, as the
same section in three places indicates that the object is to order arbi-
tration "in the manner provided for in such agreement" or "in accord-
ance with the terms of the agreement.' 24 The terms of the agreement
often include the place and manner of arbitration; consequently, the
section as a whole arguably should be interpreted so that a court
could also compel arbitration outside of the territory of the court's ju-
risdiction. 125 This interpretation, however, has not been accepted by
the courts, nor does it now seem likely that it will be.' 26
circuit court in reciting the history of the dispute indicated that the district court of
Hawaii had originally ordered the arbitration to take place in Montreal as provided for
in the arbitration agreement. As there is no written opinion for the district court, it is
not possible to verify the meaning of the statement. It would appear, however, that the
district court may have actually granted a stay pending arbitration. If the Ninth Circuit
in fact does not distinguish between compelling arbitration and granting a stay pending
arbitration, it apparently is the only circuit deciding on the issue which has failed to do
so.
122. 9 U.S.C. § 4(1970).
123. That hearing is referred to in the next preceeding sentence in section 4:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accord-
ance with the termns of the agreement.
Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. See note 115, supra.
125. A similar analysis of section 4 can be found in Sturges & Murphy, Some
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act, 17
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 580, 621-23 (1952). There the authors resolved the internal con-
tradictions of section 4 so that the language apparently restricting arbitration proceed-
ings to those held within the district would be applicable "only where the arbitration
agreement does not specify another place (outside the district) where the arbitration
shall be held." Id. at 622 (emphasis in original).
126. There are several reasons such an interpretation is not now likely. First, in the
ordinary case involving arbitration in the United States there is less need for that inter-
pretation, as it ordinarily is possible to bring the suit in the district where the arbitration
would take place. Second, where foreign arbitration is involved, it is only when the
Convention or a bilateral FCN treaty does not apply that the 1925 Act alone will be the
sole applicable law in the federal courts. Third, when the Act is the sole applicable law,
it is neither certain that in the ordinary course the award which follows the order to
compel foreign arbitration can be enforced in the federal courts, nor what rules would
be applied if it were enforced there. See notes 164-76 and accompanying text. infra.
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b. Bilateral Treaties. In those cases not covered by the 1970 Act
and Convention, but to which a bilateral FCN treaty is applicable, 127
a stronger case can be made to allow the federal courts to compel for-
eign arbitration. The typical FCN treaty provides that
"contracts... shall not be deemed unenforceable within the territories
of such other Party merely on the grounds that the place designated
for the arbitration proceedings is outside such territories .... -128 A
treaty is the supreme law of the land,129 and courts have clearly indi-
cated in cases involving a stay of proceedings that FCN treaty provi-
sions provide one basis for the federal courts to give effect to the par-
ties' contractual intent to hold arbitration abroad. 30 Thus, if a court
were to decide that, notwithstanding the treaty provisions, it could not
compel arbitration abroad under an agreement to arbitrate there, that
decision would violate the treaty clause by making such agreements
unenforceable only because of the place of arbitration.
However, the bilateral treaties remain unsatisfactory vehicles for
this purpose. First, since section 4 of the 1925 Act has been narrowly
interpreted to prevent a court from compelling arbitration in another
district, arguably the court's refusal to compel arbitration under a
contract within the purview of a FCN treaty merely treats such arbi-
tration agreement on a par with the rules for domestic arbitration and
therefore does not violate the treaty.131 Furthermore, the bilateral
treaties, like the 1925 Act, provide no assurance that the federal
courts will have jurisdiction at all,13 2 nor is it certain how or whether
an award rendered abroad on an order of the court can be enforced in
federal court thereafter. 133 Consequently, the bilateral treaties provide
little additional support to a party seeking to compel foreign arbitra-
tion through federal court action.
c. 1970 Act. The 1970 Act, in section 206, clearly provides au-
127. See note 73, supra.
128. See DOMKE, supra note 6, at 105-06. See also notes 11-13 and accompanying
text, supra.
129. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Oregon Pac. Forest Prods. Corp. v.
Welsh Panel Co., 248 F. Supp. 903 (D. Ore. 1965).
130. See notes I I 1-13 and accompanying text, stupra.
13 1. This argument, however, ignores the fact that in a domestic arbitration, there
always is one district court which can compel arbitration, while no such U.S. forum
would exist to compel foreign arbitration. See note 126, supra.
132. See notes 46-51 and accompanying text, supra.
133. See note 126, supra, and notes 177-83 and accompanying text, infra.
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thority for a federal court to compel arbitration in a foreign country.13 4
Section 206 is one of the most significant aspects of the 1970 Act
and a major breakthrough in international commercial arbitration.
Coupled with section 203, granting original jurisdiction to the federal
courts,13 5 and section 205, allowing removal to the federal courts, 36
it provides a needed certainty that an aggrieved party wishing to en-
force its arbitration agreement either in the United States or in a for-
eign country will have reasonable opportunity to do so.
The language of section 206 ("a court ... may direct that arbitra-
tion be held") 137 was inserted intentionally to distinguish between the
permissive nature of granting a motion to compel arbitration under
the 1970 Act and the mandatory nature of granting of similar motion
under section 4 of the 1925 Act.'3 8 However, it is not clear how suc-
cessful this attempt will be, for the terms of the Convention itself may
require an interpretation that a motion must be granted. First, the
Convention in mandatory language indicates that each country shall
"recognize an agreement in writing ... to submit to arbitration. ... 139
134. 9 U.S.C.A. § 206 (Supp. 1971); see note 81, supra.
It should be reiterated that the 1970 Act does not extend to arbitration in countries
not parties to the Convention. As to these situations, the limitations of section 4 of the
1925 Act remain fully applicable. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text, supra. The
impact of extending section 206 to arbitration in the United States, however, should not
be underestimated. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text, supra. It will now be pos-
sible to compel arbitration in the United States but outside the federal court's district in
a number of cases involving both United States or foreign defendants. This extension
should benefit an aggrieved party having difficulty obtaining service of process over a
potential defendant who would ordinarily be able to evade service from the court in the
district where the arbitration would take place. Query whether a similar modification of
the 1925 Act to cover purely domestic arbitration would not be a significant step for-
ward.
135. 9 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1971); see note 78, supra.
136. 9 U.S.C.A. § 205 (Supp. 1971); see note 80, supra.
137. 9 U.S.C.A. § 206 (Supp. 1971).
138. See Letter from H.G. Torbert, Jr.. Acting Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations. to Representative John W. McCormack, Dec. 3. 1969. in H.R. Rt-i. No.
1181, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970):
Section 106 [sic], permits a court to direct that arbitration be held at the place
provided for in the arbitration agreement. Since there may be circumstances in
which it would be highly desirable to direct arbitration within the district in which
the action is brought and inappropriate to direct arbitration abroad, section 206 is
permissive rather than mandatory.
Compare 9 U.S.C.A. § 206 (Supp. 1971): "A court... may direct that arbitration be
held in accordance with the agreement .... "" with 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970): "upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply there-
with is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration .. "
139. (onvention art. ll(I).
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and that "the court ... shall, at the request of one of the parties,
refer the parties to arbitration .... -140 It then provides exceptions
where the court finds that the "agreement is null and void, inopera-
tive, or incapable of being performed.' 141 Article III of the Conven-
tion requires that conditions placed upon recognition and enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards not be more onerous than those imposed on
domestic awards. 142 Thus, if the provisions of Article III apply to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements as part of the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards, it would appear that this distinction
between section 4 and section 206 cannot be sustained. 143 Second,
section 4 itself is mandatory only after certain preliminary determina-
tions have been made.' 44 The permissive language in section 206 may
mean no more than that the court need not compel foreign arbitration
unless and until it has considered the issues mentioned in Article II of
the Convention and in section 4 of the 1925 Act. Considering that the
1970 Act draws upon the 1925 Act provisions not inconsistent with
the 1970 Act or the Convention, 145 there is a rational basis for en-
grafting most of the section 4 provisions onto the 1970 Act, exclud-
ing, of course, any limitation as to the location of the arbitration.
Whether or not the bulk of section 4 of the 1925 Act is directly
applicable to a motion to compel arbitration under section 206 of the
1970 Act, the rules developed for judicial interpretation of section 4
still remain relevant to foreign arbitration, and it can be expected that
the courts will use them as a starting point for analysis under section
206. In construing section 4 the courts have weighed many of the
same factors important to a decision to stay proceedings pending arbi-
tration. 146 Under both sections 3 and 4, the courts have had an oppor-
tunity to grapple with such questions as when an agreement to arbi-
trate has been formed, what issues are arbitrable, when arbitration
140. Id. art 1(3).
141. Id.
142. Id. art. III.
143. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text, supra. The Department of State in its
analysis of the Convention appears to admit the validity of the analysis which would
consider the provisions of Article II subject to the limitations and provisions referring
to recognition and enforcement of arbitration. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TRANSMITTING THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1968).
144. 9 U.S.C. § 4(1970). See note 115, supra.
145. 9 U.S.C.A. § 208 (Supp. 1971); see note 75 and accompanying text, supra.
146. See notes 91-108 and accompanying text, supra.
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should be prevented due to fraud, or when one side should be *pre-
cluded from invoking the arbitration clause due to its own conduct
subsequent to the formation of the contract. The federal courts gener-
ally treat these issues in a similar manner under both sections, and the
cases frequently cite past decisions without differentiating between
those involving a stay of proceedings and those involving a motion to
compel arbitration. 147 However, frequently the examination of these
issues under section 4 has, if anything, been more specific than in sec-
tion 3 cases. One reason for this more minute examination is the re-
quirement in section 4 that the court must determine that there is no
dispute as to the making of the contract. If such a dispute exists, sec-
tion 4 requires the court to resolve it through a trial procedure before
an order compelling arbitration can be issued. Section 4 also requires
the court, when compelling arbitration, to do so in accordance with
the terms of the agreement. 148
When deciding whether to compel arbitration, the court will con-
sider whether a valid arbitration clause exists and whether a given
dispute is arbitrable. This examination frequently includes deciding
which individual issues are to be submitted to the arbitrators. Thus,
in Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Viet Nam 1451 involving
a dispute between a New York plaintiff and an arm of the Vietnam
government acting in a commercial capacity, the court ordered de-
fendant to present evidence related to the claim that it was not a party
to the agreement and had never agreed to arbitrate disputes under
it in New York. The court indicated:'--)
If either of these contentions is, in fact, being advanced, a new and
independent issue will have been raised under § 4 .... In that event,
the Court must proceed "summarily to the trial of that issue."
Similarly in El Hoss Engineering & Transport Co. v. American Inde-
pendent Oil Co.,'-5 involving a dispute between a Lebanese plaintiff
147. For example, the leading cases of Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics.
Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). and Kulu-
kundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg rrading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942). both of
which involved a stay of proceedings motion, have been widely cited to support deci-
sions under both sections 3 and 4.
148. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). See note 115, supra.
149. 296 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
150. Id. at 367.
151. 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1960). cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961), rev'g 183 F.
Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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seeking to compel arbitration and a United States defendant, the cir-
cuit court found that the arbitration clause and the whole contract
were ineffective without plaintiffs fulfillment of certain conditions
precedent, and remanded the case for a trial on the issue of fulfillment
of the conditions, with the decision on the motion to compel arbitra-
tion to abide the outcome. Likewise, in Necchi v. Necchi Sewing
Machine Sales Corp., 52 the circuit court indicated that the question
of the arbitrability of specific issues was for the courts, and then deter-
mined that only two out of the nine issues submitted fell within the
scope of the arbitration clause.
The question of fraud in the inducement also is a matter with which
the court concerns itself in deciding whether to compel arbitration. It
appears that the analysis utilized in a section 3 action is directly appli-
cable to a section 4 case,' 53 especially since Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. 54 is used as a starting point for analysis. For
example, in the leading case of In re Kinoshita & Co.,' 55 the court in
dicta followed Robert Lawrence and considered the arbitration clause
as separable from the main contract, indicating that under the
standard American Arbitration Association clause this determination
would be sufficient to leave the issue to the arbitrators. 56 The Su-
preme Court's acceptance of the Robert Lawrence rationale in Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.157 would also ap-
pear to extend to a motion to compel arbitration. 158
The issues of waiver and laches are frequently raised in an action to
compel arbitration. In contrast to rules applied in section 3 cases, a
court may find that conduct inconsistent with a right to arbitration,
standing alone, constitutes waiver of a right to compel arbitration. 59
152. 348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966). See discussion
at notes 97-98, supra.
153. See notes 99-104 and accompanying text, supra.
154. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
155. 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961).
156. Id. at 953. Cf. World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362
(2d Cir. 1965), in which the court, relying heavily upon Robert Lawrence, decided that
both the issue of fraud and that of waiver could be entrusted to the arbitrators in a sec-
tion 4 proceeding.
157. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See notes 101-02 and accompanying text, supra.
158. Prima Paint was a section 3 case, but the issue in that case was framed in terms
which clearly covered both sections 3 and 4 situations, and the analysis used appeared
not to be limited to a section 3 situation.
159. Compare Tsakalotos Navigation Corp. v. Sonaco, Sociedad Internacional de
Comercio, S.A., 259 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), a section 4 case where the court in-
dicated inconsistent court action usually acts as a waiver to a right to arbitrate, with
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However, the Second Circuit may have mooted the distinction by its
view that laches or waiver can be an arbitrable issue in a proceeding
to compel arbitration.' 60
Section 4 proceedings include a safeguard not normally available in
stay of proceedings cases-the right to appeal from a decision to
compel arbitration. 16 1 The rationale for granting an appeal was ex-
plained in Krauss Brothers Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc.,
where the court stated:162
So far as the arbitration proceeding itself is concerned, the last delib-
erate action of the court is the appointment of the arbitrators, who
thereupon take over the controversy and dispose of it. Their disposi-
tion is not, properly speaking, reviewed by the court, in spite of pos-
sible disturbances under sections 10 and 11. It seems to us, therefore,
that the decree is final and appealable.
The above language remains good law today. 163
In sum, the procedures available under section 4 of the 1925 Act
are generally consistent with the 1970 Act and Convention and can
reasonably be applied to foreign arbitration agreements under the
1970 Act, assuming that the post-arbitral considerations would make
such an application feasible. As will be noted in the following section,
it is precisely in the area of post-arbitral enforcement that the Conven-
tion and the 1970 Act make the most significant change in the existing
law-a change which should go far toward the goal of establishing a
reasonable method of settling multi-national commercial disputes en-
forceable in the United States and foreign countries.
Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie. 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1967). a section 3 case where the
court emphasized that not inconsistency but the presence or absence of prejudice is de-
terminative of waiver. See notes 105-106 and accompanying text, supra.
160. Compare World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362. 364
(2d Cir. 1965) ("If the parties would entrust to arbitrators the defense of fraud in the
inducement, they would also entrust to arbitrators the defense of waiver.") with Tra-
falgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) ("On
a motion to compel arbitration a District Court may consider only claims of laches
which relate to issues which the court must decide."). See notes 107-08 and accompa-
nying text, supra.
161. A stay of judicial proceedings is not generally considered to be an appealable
decision. See note 87, supra.
162. 62 F.2d 1004, 1005 (2d Cir. 1933).
163. See, e.g., Chatham Shipping Co. v. Fertex S.S. Corp., 352 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.
1965); Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de Navegaci6n de Cuba, S.A., 243 F.2d 342
(2d Cir. 1957).
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C. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
1. Under the 1925 Act
Several years ago Martin Domke observed that "no arbitration
statute in the United States... include [s] any provision for the en-
forcement of foreign arbitration awards."1 64 Except perhaps where the
arbitration agreement specifies that a federal court will render judg-
ment on a foreign award, the language of section 9 of the 1925 Act
provides no basis for enforcement. It reads in part:165
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitra-
tion, and shall specify the court, then.., any party to the arbitration
may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the
award.... If no court is specified... then such application may be
made to the United States court in and for the district within which
such award was made.
Consequently, where the federal courts have in fact enforced foreign
arbitration awards, the basis for their action must be authority other
than the precise language of section 9 of the Act.' 66
164. Domke, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 13 ARB.
J. 91, 92 (1958). See also Kawakami & Henderson, supra note 6, at 570-73.
165. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970). It would be a rare arbitration clause that specified arbitra-
tion in one country and enforcement in any other; consequently this provision in effect
precludes the Act's application to the enforcement of all foreign arbitration awards,
except those covered by section 8. See note 166, infra.
166. Section 8 appears to provide such a basis for enforcement of the award in an
admiralty action in rem. It reads:
If the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise justiciable in admiralty,,
then, notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the party claiming to be ag-
grieved may begin his proceeding hereunder by libel and seizure.., and the
court ... shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award.
9 U.S.C. § 8 (1970). However use of that clause as a basis for judicial enforcement of a
foreign arbitration award has been greeted with judicial skepticism. See Konstantinidis
v. S.S. Tarsus, 248 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 354 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1965),
where the court in dicta expressed doubt that section 8 provided any basis for it to en-
force an award rendered in Turkey, indicating:
Literally [§ 8 of the Act] confers upon the court the power to cQnfirm regardless of
where the arbitration takes place.... [H] owever, [this means that] § 8 seems in-
consistent with many other sections of the Act which provide that it is the court of
the district in which the arbitration takes place that has power to subpoena wit-
nesses (9 U.S.C. § 7), confirm the award (9 U.S.C. § 9), vacate it (9 U.S.C. § 10), or
modify it (9 U.S.C. § I I).
Id. at 287-88. Furthermore, section 8 clearly cannot be used to cover the non-admiralty
case.
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A look at the cases confirms the anomalous position of the foreign
commercial arbitration award. Although there are several reported
cases where domestic arbitration awards have been enforced in the
federal courts167 and where the federal courts have granted a stay of
proceedings pending arbitration abroad, 168 there are very few cases
reported where the federal courts have enforced a foreign arbitration
award. t 69 Furthermore, the cases give no indication that a court
would be more willing to enforce a foreign arbitration award rendered
after the court has issued a stay of proceedings pending arbitration or
an order compelling arbitration than to enforce an award based upon
foreign arbitration previously unconnected with the federal courts. 70
Regardless of the treatment given arbitration awards under the
1925 Act, a prevailing party in foreign arbitration has not been en-
tirely without a federal court remedy. He could frequently obtain a
foreign judgment based on the award and then sue on that judgment
in the federal court in the same manner as with any other foreign
judgment. Even under the traditional doctrine of Hilton v. Guyot,171
such a judgment would, as a minimum, be given conclusive effect in
the federal courts, at least where there was reciprocity between the
United States and the country of judgment. 172 Moreover, there is
reason to believe that a long-term effect of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino173 may be to narrow the
167. See, e.g., Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1967); Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum Corp., 312 F.2d
299 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chi-
lean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1960); Murray Oil Prods. Co.
v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1944).
168. See note 88, supra.
169. The author only found two cases from the past 15 years where a foreign arbi-
tration award had been enforced in the federal courts-Standard Magnesium Corp. v.
Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1957), and San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A.
v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd.. 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961). The latter case commenced
with an admiralty action when Saguenay seized defendant's ship in Hawaii and passed
through arbitration in Montreal to an action in the district court in Hawaii for enforce-
ment of the award. Thus, the result could be explainable under section 8 of the 1925
Act. See note 166, supra.
170. This conclusion is based primarily upon a negative implication: There are few
cases involving foreign arbitration awards. None of these makes the above distinction.
Therefore, foreign awards based upon arbitration following a stay of proceedings or
order to compel arbitration do not enjoy a preferred status before the court..
171. 159 U.S. 113(1895).
172. Id.; Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966);
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Pub[. Co., 232 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
173. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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gap between recognition of foreign country judgments and those of
other American courts.' 74
The treatment of prevailing parties in foreign arbitration is inade-
quate when compared to enforcement of domestic arbitration under
the 1925 Act. 175 Furthermore, should the court be willing to enforce a
foreign arbitral award, the safeguards of sections 10 and 11 of the
1925 Act, providing a statutory.basis for vacating, modifying, or cor-
recting an award, appear to be unavailable to the party defending
against its enforcement. 17 6 Consequently, under the 1925 Act the
machinery for dealing with foreign arbitral awards has been highly
deficient. Barring a reversal of judicial attitudes concerning the Act, it
is highly unlikely that the 1925 Act by itself can be turned into a reli-
able instrument for giving effect to foreign arbitral awards not cov-
ered by the Convention and the 1970 Act. Since the Convention
would now validate awards coming within its purview, there is far less
reason for so applying the 1925 Act to those cases not covered by
treaty than there would have been in the past, and such a judicial ex-
tension may well be dismissed from serious consideration.
2. Under Bilateral Treaties
When a bilateral FCN treaty with a clause covering arbitration is
applicable, there are valid reasons for the federal courts to recognize
and enforce arbitral awards so covered, notwithstanding that they do
not come within the purview of the Convention and the 1970 Act.'77
Where a bilateral treaty applies, both countries are pledged to enforce
an award rendered in favor of a national of the other country to the
174. The Court limited Hilton to a fairly narrow area, indicating:
Although Hilton v. Guyot ... contains some broad language about the relationship
of reciprocity to comity, the case in fact imposed a requirement of reciprocity only
in regard to conclusiveness of judgments, and even then only in limited circum-
stances.
Id. at 411. Justice White, dissenting, seemed to fear that the Act of State doctrine as
espoused by the majority opinion ran counter to and undermined the Hilton view of the
validity of foreign judgments. Id. at 448-50. Cf. Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258
F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966).
175. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1970).
176. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1970). Both sections begin as follows:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order... upon the application of any
party to the arbitration....
177. See notes 11-13, 24-25 and accompanying text, supra.
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same extent as if it had been rendered in its own country. t 78 Since
these treaties are based on reciprocal enforcement, their application to
the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards should work to the
long-term benefit of nationals of both countries and promote interna-
tional commerce. A problem exists, however, in converting the treaty
rights into a viable enforcement mechanism. It seems unlikely that the
courts will declare that awards rendered abroad under bilateral FCN
treaties are covered by the 1925 Act; 179 it is unrealistic to think the
courts would fashion a remedy based on the existence of the treaty
provisions alone;' 8 0 and clearly the 1970 Act does not have any effect
on these bilateral treaty rights. 181 However, these treaty provisions
could be given vitality by a simple amendment to the 1970 Act
placing bilateral treaty rights on a par with those derived from the
Convention. 182 Considering the long-standing United States policy to
promote FCN treaties, there is much merit in making this change in
order not to penalize those nations which supported our bilateral ef-
178. See note 12 and accompanying text, supra.
179. To do so would strain the language of sections 9-11 of the 1925 Act. See notes
165 and 176 and accompanying text, supra. Furthermore, the 1970 Act was felt neces-
sary because it was considered that the 1925 Act could not be used as a vehicle for en-
forcing such treaty rights. See note 55 and accompanying text, supra.
180. Such a solution would first pose a jurisdictional problem, with little likelihood
of federal court jurisdiction, except through diversity. Cf. notes 46-51 and accompa-
nying text, supra. Furthermore, this solution would involve the development of a form
of federal common law likely to clash with the Erie doctrine, unless saved by applica-
tion of an extension of the Clearfield Trust doctrine. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
181. The Convention clearly states that it does not "affect the validity
of... bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards entered into by the Contracting States .... Convention art. VII( 1). The scope of
the 1970 Act is limited to arbitration covered by the Convention as acceded to by the
United States. See notes 58-73 and accompanying text, supra.
182. Such an amendment could add an additional section to 9 U.S.C., reading as
follows:
§ 209. For purposes of this Chapter, an arbitral award which falls within the terms
of the arbitral provision of a bilateral FCN treaty between the United States and
another country and which is not within the terms of the Convention as acceded to
by the United States solely because the site of the arbitration was in a country not a
party to the Convention will be deemed to be an award covered by this Chapter;
PROVIDED, however, that the grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting an
award will be those listed in sections 10 and 11 of Chapter 1 of this Title; and
PROVIDED further that in applying section 208 of this Title, Chapter 1 will be
deemed to apply to the extent not in conflict with this Chapter or the terms of the
bilateral treaty under which enforcement of the award is sought.
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forts but which for various reasons find themselves unable to join the
multi-lateral Convention system. 183
3. Under the Convention and 1970 Act
In contrast to the situation created under the 1925 Act and the bi-
lateral treaties, where the Convention applies there is a clear-cut path
to recognition of foreign arbitral awards. Section 207 of the 1970 Act
provides the statutory basis for federal court enforcement and recogni-
tion of the award upon the application of any party184 within three
years of the time the award is made. 85 Section 207 indicates the court
shall confirm the awards "unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal
or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the
said Convention."' 86
Although the meshing of the Convention and the statute in en-
forcing arbitral awards is complex, it would appear that a defendant
183. The following hypothetical examples indicate the problems posed through
failure to apply the 1970 Act to arbitral awards covered by the FCN treaties:
1. Arbitration between American and French parties: If held in France, it will be
covered by the 1970 Act and Convention as well as our FCN treaty with France. If held
in Belgium or England, it would not be covered by the 1970 Act, but only by the FCN
treaty with France, as neither Belgium nor the United Kingdom is a party to the Con-
vention.
2. Arbitration between American and Belgian parties: If held in Belgium it would
only be covered by our FCN treaty with Belgium. It would still be covered by the FCN
treaty with Belgium even if held in England. If held in France, it will be covered by the
1970 Act and Convention as well as the FCN treaty with Belgium.
3. Arbitration between American and British parties: If held in England, it would not
be covered by the 1970 Act and Convention or by a FCN treaty. If held in Belgium, it
would still not be covered. However, if held in France, it would come under the provi-
sions of the 1970 Act and Convention.
It is submitted that there is no policy justification either under the Convention or the
FCN treaties for the differing results in the above situations. Amending the 1970 Act to
apply to the FCN treaties would insure that the arbitration is covered by that act so long
as the arbitration is held in a country adhering to the Convention or the other party is
from a country with which we have a FCN treaty. Only arbitration not covered by either
the Convention or a FCN treaty would fall outside the 1970 Act. See the proposed
amendment in note 182, supra.
184. 9 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Supp. 1971). See note 81 and accompanying text, supra.
The language of that section makes it clear that there is no nationality requirement
as to either party. Both could be United States parties or foreign parties so long as
the court has jurisdiction under sections 202 and 203. See notes 58-72 and 78 and
accompanying text, supra.
185. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970), which sets up a one year limitation.
186. 9 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Supp. 1971). Compare the language of 9 U.S.C.A. § 206
(Supp. 1971) regarding an order compelling arbitration: "A court ... may direct that
arbitration be held ..." (emphasis added).
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against whom an award is being enforced has a network of protection
which includes and exceeds that available when a purely domestic
award is being enforced. In enforcing domestic arbitration awards, the
courts will not ordinarily set aside an award on the basis of errors of
fact or law unless there has been a manifest disregard for the law.' 8 7
However, an award can be upset for a number of reasons, including
situations in which the arbitrator exceeded his power 188 or was par-
tial or corrupt.18 9 The Supreme Court has recently taken a very strict
view of the problem of bias or partiality in arbitration proceedings. In
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.'9 0 it set
aside an arbitration award under section 10(b) of the 1925 Act, re-
lating to bias of arbitrators, even though it found specifically that
apart from an undisclosed business relationship with one of the parties
there was no evidence whatsoever of possible fraud or bias. It goes
without saying that partiality as disclosed in the record also would be
a valid basis for reversal in a proper case.191
It appears that under the Convention and the 1970 Act the safe-
guards built into the domestic award scheme would survive and be
187. The "manifest disregard" principle was definitively set out (albeit in dicta) in
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). It has been repeated in many arbitration
award cases. See, e.g., San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Ter-
minals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean
Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp, 274 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960):
Sociedad Armadora Aristomenis Panama S.A. v. Tri-coast S.S. Co., 184 F. Supp. 738
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Parsons & Whittemore Inc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Nordstjernan. 141
F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The rationale for the limited review concept was well
expressed in Amicizia:
IT] he court's function in confirming or vacating an arbitration award is severely
limited. If it were otherwise, the ostensible purpose for resort to arbitration, i.e.,
avoidance of litigation, would be frustrated. ... The statutory provisions ... do
not authorize its setting aside on the grounds of erroneous finding of fact or of
misinterpretation of law.
274 F.2d at 808.
188. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1970). See, e.g., Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern
States Petroleum Corp., 312 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963), where
the court refused to uphold an award against one party, indicating that the arbitrators
had exceeded their power "in determining the obligations of a corporation which was
clearly not a party to the arbitration .... 312 F.2d at 300.
189. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1970). See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Conti-
nental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Saxis S.S Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967).
190. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
191. See Saxis S.S. Co. v. iMultifacs Int'l Traders Inc., 375 F.2d 577. 582 (2d Cir.
1967), where the court said:
When a claim of partiality is made, the court is under an obligation to scan the
record to see if it demonstrates "evident partiality" on the part of the




augmented by the new provisions. The 1970 Act looks to the Conven-
tion for grounds for non-enforcement of an arbitral award. z92 Article
V of the Convention would allow the court to refuse to enforce an
award both at the request of a party and on its own motion. 193
Grounds for so doing appear broad enough to subsume the domestic
doctrine developed around sections 9, 10, and 11 of the 1925 Act, so
that these sections (absent their geographical limitations) would be
brought into the 1970 Act's scheme via section 208.194
Under the Convention, when one party seeks to set aside an arbitra-
tion award, a court may do so on several grounds. First, it may do so
where the parties lacked capacity to agree to arbitrate. 95 Second, it
may set aside the award where the agreement to arbitrate is invalid
under the law to which the parties subjected it or under the law where
the arbitration took place if no other law was specified.191 A third
ground is that a party was not given proper notice or was otherwise
unable to present its case. This section is broad enough to cover not
only due process issues, but also all or most of section 10(c) of the
1925 Act.' 97 A fourth ground is that the arbitrators exceeded the
scope of the submission to them and that the decisions beyond the
scope cannot be separated out. This section would subsume the provi-
192. See text at note 186, supra.
193. Convention art. V. For a more detailed discussion of these provisions, see
Contini, supra note 18, at 298-304, and Quigley, supra note 18, at 1066-71.
194. 9 U.S.C.A. § 208 (Supp. 1971). That section indicates that all parts of the
1925 Act apply to proceedings under the 1970 Act unless they conflict with the
Convention as ratified. Note, however, that there is only limited power to modify
awards under the Convention and no equivalent to section Il of the 1925 Act, which
would modify an award in several particulars. The new scheme is generally limited to
enforcement of the entire award, deferral, or refusal to enforce. Compare 9 U.S.C.A.
§ 207 (Supp. 1971) with Convention art. V, and 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1970). See note 198
and accompanying text. infra.
195. Convention art. V(I)(a). The Convention indicates that the issue of ca-
pacity is to be determined under the law applicable to the parties. Quigley feels this
language was intended to allow the enforcing state to determine under its conflicts
rules which law should govern the capacity issue. Quigley, supra note 18, at 1067.
196. Convention art. V(1)(a). Contini indicates the intention here was to avoid
having the forum decide the applicable law under its ordinary choice of law rules.
Contini, supra note 18, at 300.
197. Convention art. V(l)(b). See 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1970):
In either of the following cases the... court ... may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party...
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
Cf. Quigley, supra note 18, at 1067.
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sions of section 10(d) of the 1925 Act.198 Fifth, the court may set
aside the award where the arbitration authority was improperly con-
stituted.1 99 Sixth, a court may set the award aside where it is not yet
binding or had been set aside by competent authority where ren-
dered.2 00 In addition, the court on its own motion can decide to refuse
to enforce or recognize an award in two situations: 1) when the subject
matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration under United States
law, and 2) when recognition and enforcement would be contrary to
public policy.20 1 It is through these latter provisions that the expanded
protection is available to a defendant fighting local enforcement of a
foreign award. These sections are broad enough not only to subsume
the parts of section 10 of the 1925 Act dealing with awards procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means, or where the arbitrators evi-
denced partiality or corruption, 20 2 but also to permit the development
of other doctrines which are necessary to insure adequate protection
to defendants.
Thus, the scheme developed for enforcement of foreign arbitration
awards provides the plaintiff with access to United States courts for
enforcement of his foreign arbitral award and also provides the de-
fendant with a network of protection which not only includes that
available for enforcement of domestic awards, but is flexible enough
to insure that the legitimate interests of the United States will not be
subverted by mechanical approval of unjust arbitral awards. However,
in a system based upon reciprocity any tendency to take an overly
narrow view of foreign arbitral awards will be balanced by a desire to
198. Convention art. V(l)(c). See 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1970):
In either of the following cases the ... court... may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party...
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
This provision of the Convention is an exception to the rule under section 207 that the
courts cannot modify an award under the Convention. See note 194, supra.
199. Convention art. V(I)(d). An improperly constituted arbitral authority would
be one not conforming to the agreement, or, absent agreement, contrary to the law of
the situs of the arbitration. Id.
200. Convention art. V(l)(e). There is considerable confusion regarding the status
of an award subject to possible review in the state where rendered, and interpretation of
this provision may be difficult. See Contini, supra note 18, at 303-04, and Quigley. supra
note 18, at 1069-70.
201. Convention art. V(2).
202. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a) and (b) (1970). See notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
supra.
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obtain the widest acceptance of America's awards among the courts of
other signatory states, which also have the public policy loophole
available to them.
CONCLUSION
By ending 50 years of hostility toward a broad approach to en-
forcement of international commercial arbitration and acceding to the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, the United States has at last recognized the need for a less
parochial attitude toward the resolution of multi-national business
disputes. The federal court system will play a dominant role in many
international commercial arbitration disputes. The 1970 enabling
statute bypasses several complicated issues surrounding the status of
the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act in the relationship between state
and federal jurisdiction. Where the 1970 Act applies a federal court
has original jurisdiction to resolve questions related to the enforce-
ment of arbitral agreements, the power to compel arbitration in a for-
eign country, and a statutory basis for enforcement and recognition
of an award properly rendered by a foreign arbitration tribunal cov-
ered by the Convention.
The new federal court role is not an unlimited one. Primarily due
to the reservations with which the United States acceded to the Con-
vention, there is a vast area of international commercial arbitration
not covered by the new scheme. The rules guiding this area have not
changed, and all the problems and limitations of the pre-existing
system remain. Major interpretation problems develop in delineating
the border between arbitration covered by the Convention and 1970
Act and arbitration covered by pre-existing law. The consequences of
falling on one side or the other make it important to determine exactly
when the new scheme will apply. In particular, the United States' ac-
cession to the Convention excludes from its application arbitration
taking place within the territory of countries which are not parties to
the Convention.
The new framework is not unilateral. By making the reservations in
accession, the United States has insured not only that it will give effect
to arbitration in certain foreign countries, but that these countries,
guided by similar rules governing recognition and enforcement of ar-
bitration, will also give effect to arbitration taking place in this
487
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country. The result should work to the advantage of both American
and foreign businessmen. For example, an American armed with an
award rendered in New York can enforce it under the Convention in
Tokyo, Paris, Hamburg or Moscow. Fear of unfair treatment from
foreign arbitrators or that our own interests will be violated is largely
alleviated by the safeguards built into the Convention, including the
enforcing court's right to refuse recognition of an award where con-
trary to the public policy of the forum.
Particular note should be taken of the continued vitality of the
1925 Act, not only where the Convention does not apply, but also
under the new system. Much of the 1925 Act is specifically incorpo-
rated into the new scheme via section 208 of the 1970 Act, and much
of the rest remains persuasive authority. In particular, aside from ju-
risdictional limitations imposed by the 1925 Act, most of the body of
law applicable to pre-arbitral adjudication and most, if not all, of the
defenses to post-arbitral enforcement remain valid under the new
framework.
Over the past 25 years this country has built up a network of bilat-
eral FCN treaties which include provisions for enforcement of arbitra-
tion. Under the new multi-lateral approach, the status of these treaty
rights remains in limbo. The Convention leaves them undisturbed,
and the 1970 Act does not reach them. A simple amendment to the
1970 Act could clarify this problem and provide these treaty rights
with a statutory backup comparable to that provided rights arising
under the Convention. Since the bilateral rights are based on nation-
ality of the parties and not the place of arbitration, and because sev-
eral of the FCN treaties are with countries not parties to the Conven-
tion, these treaties will play an important role in the total international
commercial arbitration framework and should not be shunted aside by
the new policy shift.
Whether the Convention and 1970 Act will play the prominent role
expected by those who long advocated United States support of the
multi-lateral approach remains to be seen. Nevertheless, a potentially
important tool for resolving private international disputes is now
available. It is up to those daily involved in international transactions
to test it and put it to good use.
Donald P. Swisher*
'Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n. B.A., 1956, J.D., 1971. University of Wash-
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